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This dissertation examines securitization in the U.S. banking industry before the financial 
crisis. It employs organizational political economy framework and offers a historical 
investigation on the relations between the state and the banking industry in the reconfiguration of 
political–legal and organizational arrangements related to securitization. I identify three specific 
arrangements that make securitization legal, viable, and favorable for banks: (1) the attack on 
Glass–Steagall, (2) the use of special purpose vehicles (SPVs), and (3) regulatory capital 
requirement. In light of the conceptual framework and historical contextualization, I argue there 
are three organizational causes of banks’ increasing engagement in securitization: (1) capital 
dependence, (2) organizational complexity, and (3) political activity.  
I collect organizational-level data of bank holding companies from 2001 to 2007 and perform 
descriptive and regression analysis to examine banks’ engagement in various forms of 
securitization and how the organizational causes proposed above shape securitization. The 
analysis lends support to the organizational political economy framework in general yet reveals a 
nuanced picture of the landscape of securitization in the U.S. banking industry. While certain 
forms of securitization have long been common practice and allowed under Glass–Steagall, other 
forms, typically involving higher risk, are newly legal and viable and quickly become favorable 
for banks after a series of reconfiguration of political–legal and organizational arrangements led 
by the largest banks. On one hand, banks hold more securities on their balance sheet to overcome 
higher capital constraint, because securities are more flexible and profitable and are treated more 
favorably in regulatory capital requirement. On the other hand, larger banks are more active in 
newly accessible opportunities, such as holding private-label securities and selling and 
iii 
securitizing assets, won by their political mobilization. They make up a disproportionately higher 
share in these forms of securitization among all banks, compared to conventional business of 
holdings securities issued or guaranteed by government agencies and government-sponsored 
enterprises. Banks set up new entities, including off-balance-sheet SPVs, to participate in these 
newly available businesses, accumulating risk within their increasingly complex organizational 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
At the dawn of the financial crisis of 2007–08, banks were at the center of securitization, 
which was widely recognized as a major contributor to the crisis. Securitization is a process in 
which assets are packaged and repackaged into various types of securities. For banks, 
securitization helps replace illiquid assets (e.g., mortgages, credit card receivables, commercial 
loans) with securities with high liquidity (i.e., can be easily traded on financial markets), thereby 
providing more opportunities to reap profit. At the same time, however, the excessive risk 
brought about by unregulated securitization and accumulated in the banking industry is 
consequential to the crisis.  
Provisions of the Banking Act of 1933, collectively and commonly known as “Glass–
Steagall,” kept commercial banks from investment banking. It prohibited banks from carrying 
and dealing with most types of securities, intending to harness speculative trading and avoid high 
risk. Commercial banks were only allowed to purchase, sell, underwrite, and distribute a small 
amount of eligible securities such as U.S. government bonds and municipal general obligation 
bonds. Although banks were largely excluded from securities market under Glass–Steagall, they 
gradually won the access and have played a significant role in the expansion of securities market 
through a series of new political–legal and organizational arrangements in the last quarter of the 
20th century (Prechel and Hou 2016). At the turn of the 21st century, banks successfully 
enveloped every step of securitization from packaging, issuance, underwriting, to investment 
within their complex organizational structure. Statistics show the expansion of securities market 
and banks’ increasing involvement in mortgage-backed securities (MBS), asset-backed securities 
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(ABS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO), among others (Davis 2009; Rona-Tas and Hiss 
2010; Fligstein and Goldstein 2010; MacKenzie 2011). To illustrate, private-label ABS (ABS 
issued by private financial institutions) issuance climbed from virtually none in the early 1980s, 
to around $400 billion in 1998, and $1.7 trillion at its peak in 2006 (Cetorelli and Peristiani 
2012). Throughout 1983 to 2008, bank holding companies issued half of private-label ABS. 
After the passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, which formally allowed banks to 
expand into investment banking, bank holding companies took nearly 70 percent of the market 
share of securities underwriting (Cetorelli and Peristiani 2012). As for holding of securities, at 
the year end of 2007, banks held $971.42 million of residential MBS, making up 16.7% of that 
market (Inside Mortgage Finance Publications 2015).  
Securitization is a form of financialization, whereby financial activities, rather than 
production activities and trade, have become increasingly dominant in the economy and society 
(Arrighi [1994] 2010; Stockhammer 2004; Foster 2007; Orhangazi 2008; Krippner 2012). 
Sociology has a long history of examining the relationship between the economy and other 
dimensions of society since Karl Marx ([1867] 1977) and Max Weber ([1922] 1978). Various 
subfields of sociology, including economic sociology, sociology of organizations, and political 
sociology, provide important insights on financial markets in general and securities market in 
particular in recent years. Researchers acknowledge the rise of finance in the U.S. and financial 
deregulation since the late 1970s (e.g., Davis and Mizruchi 1999; Prechel 2000, 2003; Davis 
2009; Campbell 2010; Mizruchi 2010, 2013; Fligstein and Goldstein 2012; Krippner 2012). 
Specifically, there are two broad lines of research that investigate securitization by banks: (1) a 
line that focuses on the formation and expansion of securities market and takes securitization as a 
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new business model and a new norm for banks and (2) a line that traces the political and 
historical development of policies and deregulations of securities market. 
The first line of research documents how banks chose securitization as their new business 
model. Since the late 1970s, corporate and individual customers turned to alternative markets 
such as commercial paper and money market funds for higher returns that banks under interest 
rate ceiling could not offer. Both the depositing and lending functions of banks were 
undermined. The response of banks to this profitability crisis was to find out new channels to 
ensure their profit. Securitization presented new opportunities and thus marked a new model for 
the banking industry. Instead of making and holding loans (the “originate-and-hold” model), 
banks could also package loans into securities and sell them on the market (the “originate-and-
sell” model) (Davis 2009; Fligstein and Goldstein 2012). Fligstein and Goldstein (2014) suggest 
that this new business model involved a shift toward vertically integrated industrial model, in 
which banks engaged in all phases of the mortgage securitization industry. 
The development of securitization as the new business model for banks concurs with the 
concentration of securitization activities and securitized assets. A smaller number of financial 
institutions have taken a larger share of securities market. For instance, while the top five MBS 
packagers accounted for 24.8% of the market share in 1996, this number climbed up to 41.0% in 
2007 (Fligstein and Goldstein 2010:43–44). Meanwhile, as Acharya and Richardson (2009) 
show, originators of securities were also the largest investors in these securities, keeping the risk 
concentrated among large financial institutions. 
Scholars further investigate how this new business model of securitization gave birth to the 
financial crisis. Some borrow Perrow’s (1984) normal accident theory and claim that the high 
complexity and tight coupling of the financial sector were the underlying factors to the crisis 
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(Guillen and Suarez 2010; Palmer and Maher 2010). To illustrate, the emergence of diversified 
financial institutions and creation of new securities products contribute to high complexity, while 
high leverage and over-the-counter markets without a clearinghouse or exchange contribute to 
tight coupling in securities market (Guillen and Suarez 2010:266). Moreover, Palmer and Maher 
(2010) maintains that securitization results in a high degree of complexity (e.g., the valuation of 
securities and process of securitization were poorly understood), resulting in feedback loops that 
eventually led to the mortgage meltdown.  
Yet other scholars follow Meyer and Roman (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and 
highlight the role of legitimacy in organizational field (banking industry) and the 
homogenization of organizational behavior and structure (securitization and vertical integration). 
In other words, the increasing engagement in securitization and excessive risk-taking activities 
have become a norm in the banking industry. For example, Abolafia (2010) argues that market 
fundamentalism shared by academic, political, and regulatory institutions contributed to the 
financial crisis.  
In summary, this line of research maintains that securitization has become the new business 
model and the new norm in the banking industry. At the same time, the securities market became 
more concentrated, integrated, and complex. Theoretically, this literature shares a 
(neo-)institutionalist underpinning in that it focuses on the adoption and diffusion of a new norm 
(engagement in securitization) and related organizational structure (a complex vertically 
integrated structure). 
The second line of research has a policy focus in the analysis of financialization and its 
consequence. Specifically, it documents the historical development of two policy arenas: 
excessive credit supply and financial deregulation. 
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In terms of credit supply, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the Federal Reserve kept the 
interest rate low. Interest rate hit pre-crisis historic low after the crash of dotcom bubbles around 
2000. Low interest rate served as a signal of sufficient credit supply, therefore encouraging 
families and businesses to incur more debt. Meanwhile, new entrants to the mortgage market 
such as investment banks, who were subject to less regulation, exploited the cheap credit and 
increasingly involved themselves in risky lending in the mortgage industry (Campbell 2010; 
Krippner 2012). In addition, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 made the interest paid on residential 
mortgage the only consumer loans that was tax deductible, creating further incentives for people 
to take second mortgages to finance their spending (Silvers and Slavkin 2009; Campbell 2010) 
and boosting the secondary mortgage market.  
In terms of financial deregulation, a series of legislation from 1980 to 2000 redefined the 
regulatory regime of the financial sector. The cumulative consequence of deregulation is the 
repeal of financial regulations designed by the New Deal, notably the Banking Act of 1933, the 
Glass–Steagall provisions of which separated commercial banks from investment banks, and the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which created barriers to mergers between banks and 
nonbanks. Major pieces of legislation include: the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980, the Garn–St. Germaine Act of 1982, the Secondary Mortgage 
Market Enhancement Act of 1984, the Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act of 1994, the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, and the Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act of 2000 (Isenberg 2000; Prechel 2003; Morris 2005; McCoy and Renuart 2008; Campbell 
2010; Johnson and Kwak 2010; Prechel 2016; Prechel and Hou 2016). 
During the two decades of deregulation, banks gradually expanded their business into 
multiple lines of financial activities and across multiple regions. Banks evolved into financial 
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conglomerates such as Citicorp and JPMorgan Chase, offering one-stop financial services from 
loan issuance, securities underwriting, insurance, to merger and acquisition advising (Campbell 
2010; Schneiberg and Bartley 2010). The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act marked the final and 
complete repeal of the New Deal regime of financial regulations featured by Glass–Steagall and 
the Bank Holding Company Act by granting banks permission to fully engage in securities 
market, where regulations were even more lax. Highly complex and risky financial products such 
as ABS and CDO were not regulated by any regulatory jurisdiction. In 2000, the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act removed the trading ban on stock-futures (Campbell 2010; Johnson 
and Kwak 2010; Prechel and Morris 2010).  
As the literature review above shows, extant research sheds important light on financialization 
and securitization. However, despite the widely recognized notions that unregulated 
financialization brought about excessive risk in the financial sector and that securitization had 
become a prevailing practice in the banking industry before the financial crisis, little research has 
yet examined securitization as an organizational-level behavior and strategy of banks. It remains 
unanswered the extent to which banks engage in securitization and the organizational causes of 
securitization. This gap in the literature is at least partially due to that extant research falls short 
of capturing the corporate–state dynamics that makes securitization legal, viable, and favorable 
for banks, especially the design of regulatory capital requirement, as will be detailed in the 
coming chapters. Banks do not participate in securitization out of thin air; instead, they are 
embedded in the environment that provides opportunities and incentives for them to participate 
in securitization.  
Notable exceptions are Prechel and Morris (2010) and Prechel and Zheng (2016), whose 
framework in examining financialization at large is highly relevant. To illustrate, these two 
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studies maintain that changing political–legal and organizational arrangements associated with 
financialization (e.g., increased organizational complexity) offer opportunities and incentives for 
business organizations to engage in financial malfeasance such as misrepresentation of financial 
statements (Prechel and Morris 2010) and violations against Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) rules (Prechel and Zheng 2016). Quantitative analyses further suggest that 
certain organizational characteristics, including more complex organizational structure, larger 
size, higher capital dependence, and managerial strategies in favor of shareholder value, are 
associated with higher likelihood to engage in financial malfeasance. This dissertation follows 
these organizational-level analyses to investigate the changes in political–legal and 
organizational arrangements related to securitization and quantitatively assess the organizational 
causes of securitization in the banking industry. 
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 elaborates the conceptual 
framework of organizational political economy with the help of a critical assessment of extant 
literature. It also provides a historical review of the changes in political–legal and organizational 
arrangements related to securitization. Hypotheses on how securitization is shaped by 
organizational causes are accordingly derived from the conceptual framework and historical 
contextualization. Chapter 3 discusses the research design of the organizational-level analysis. 
Chapter 4 reports the descriptive statistics of measures of various forms of securitization in the 
banking industry. Chapter 5 reports the findings on regression analysis of securitization. Chapter 
6 presents concluding remarks on empirical and theoretical implications of this study and 
discusses directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
In the first chapter, I classify current research on financialization and securitization into two 
broad lines. The first examines securitization as a new business model and a new risk-taking 
norm in the banking industry. The second traces the policy and regulatory roots of securitization 
and financial crisis. In this chapter, I first provide a critical review of these two broad lines of 
literature. I then suggest that the conceptual framework of organizational political economy can 
overcome the shortcomings of the extant literature. Furthermore, I use this conceptual framework 
to contextualize the historical changes in political–legal and organizational arrangements related 
to securitization. Finally, I propose hypotheses in light of the organizational political economy 
framework and historical contextualization.  
Critical Revisit of Extant Research 
The first line of literature, which highlights securitization as a new business model and new 
norm in the banking industry, is rooted in (neo-)institutionalism. It also shares the drawback of 
(neo-)institutional theory that the state is assumed to be autonomous. This assumption suggests 
that the financial sector drives the creation and expansion of the securities market on its own. In 
contrast, those who focus on policies related to financialization maintain that the state 
independently grants property rights to and implement regulatory policies on market participants 
(Campbell and Lindberg 1990), leaving the financial sector out of its analytical framework. 
However, both have been criticized because they focus on one specific group of social actors (the 
financial sector in the first line and the state in the second line) and gives little attention to other 
social actors in the creation and development of markets.  
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Critics have pointed out that the state is neither autonomous nor independent of other social 
forces in formulating policies (Prechel 1990, 2000). Rather, monetary policies and deregulation 
since the late 1970s were largely the result of political mobilization led by the corporate sector. 
To overcome the shortcomings of one-sided focus, organizational political economy framework 
calls for a historical investigation on the interdependent corporate–state relations (Prechel 1990, 
2000; Prechel and Morris 2010). Recent empirical studies employing this conceptual framework 
(e.g., Prechel and Morris 2010; Prechel and Zheng 2016) have demonstrated that organizations 
exercise power to influence the policy-making processes and therefore should be examined in 
their own right. The history of the last quarter of the 20th century is characterized by extensive 
lobbying efforts of the business community in general and the financial sector in particular 
proposing deregulation and requesting more property rights. With regard to securitization, the 
banking industry constantly influenced multiple regulatory agencies to redefine arrangements in 
ways that gave them more leeway and favorable treatment in securities market (Prechel and Hou 
2016). 
As will be detailed in the next two sections, organizational political economy framework 
helps better understand how the corporate–state dynamics contributes to the changes in political–
legal and organizational arrangement related to securitization and how these newly defined 
arrangements shape banks’ engagement in securitization. 
Organizational Political Economy Framework 
Organizational political economy examines the interplay between dimensions of the social 
structure: organizations, politics, law, and the economy. Specifically, it analyzes the 
development and implementation of policies in light of corporate–state relations in a historical 
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setting. It underlines organizations as major actors in corporate–state relations and thus the major 
unit of analysis.  
The U.S. state is a complex organization; it contains three supra-unit branches (executive, 
legislative, and judicial) and multiple subunits (e.g., the SEC, the Federal Reserve) (Prechel 
1990, 2000). One of the major abilities of the state is to define, implement, and enforce property 
rights, which further shapes the power relations among social actors in the economy (Campbell 
and Lindberg 1990). Research shows that regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Reserve and 
the SEC, were constantly under pressure from the financial sector since the late 1970s (Kwan 
1997; Johnson and Kwak 2010; Prechel and Hou 2016). With the help of extensive political 
mobilization, various industries within the financial sector successfully won the access to 
additional lines of business. Through this reconfiguration of political–legal arrangements in the 
last quarter of the 20th century, balance of power in the economy shifted in favor of the financial 
sector due to its consolidated power (Prechel and Hou 2016).  
Also, the organizational complexity of the U.S. state provides opportunities that allow certain 
groups to politically mobilize to achieve their agenda through multiple agencies of the state 
(Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985; Prechel 1990). For instance, in its exploitation of Glass–
Steagall loopholes, when the banking industry failed to convince Congress to address their 
needs, it turned to seek support from the Federal Reserve and succeeded (Kwan 1997; Johnson 
and Kwak 2010).  
Business organizations and their trade associations have long been a major social force in 
corporate America (Perrow 1986). Mechanisms such as lobbying, political action committee 
(PAC), interlocking directorate, and revolving door between public services and private sector 
demonstrate the capability of business community to exercise power in policy making (Mills 
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1956; Useem 1982; Clawson, Neustadtl, and Bearden 1986; Mizruchi 1989; Prechel 1990). The 
last quarter of the 20th century witnessed how the financial sector won deregulation through 
political mobilization formed by leading financial institutions (e.g., JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, 
Merrill Lynch, and Salomon Brothers), major trade associations (e.g., the American Bankers 
Association and the Securities Industry Association), and PACs representing this economic 
sector (Prechel 2003; Prechel and Morris 2010; Prechel and Hou 2016). At the end of the 20th 
century, financial sector has become the rising power in the economy, contributing most to the 
capital accumulation and having a crucial influence on the state to push their agenda (Davis 
2009; Johnson and Kwak 2010; Krippner 2012; Prechel and Hou 2016). Financial institutions 
“can shape structures in their own narrow interests and promulgate cultures such as free market 
ideologies that will mask or justify narrow interest” (Perrow 2010:328). 
The state and business organizations are not isolated from each other. Instead, organizational 
political economy framework contends that the state and business organizations are 
interdependent with each other. Resource dependence theory argues that since no organization is 
self-contained, organizations need to maintain relations with elements in their environment and 
acquire critical resources and services they need to reduce dependence and gain autonomy 
(Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Organizational political economy 
framework gives a general nod to resource dependence theory by emphasizing the 
interdependency of the U.S. state and corporate America. However, it differs from and goes 
beyond resource dependence theory in that it highlights the political embeddedness of this 
interdependency. On one hand, the U.S. state has no independent channel for revenues; it is 
dependent on tax, a large portion of which is collected from business organizations in its 
environment. Therefore, it is in the interest of the state to ensure economic prosperity. On the 
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other hand, business organizations are dependent on pivotal resources such as capital and access 
to markets that are largely controlled and regulated by the state. To overcome resource 
dependence and gain autonomy, business organizations have incentives to mobilize politically to 
influence the state to redefine the political–legal and organizational arrangements in which they 
are embedded. 
Moreover, organizational political economy framework suggests that the interdependency 
between the state and corporate America is historically contingent. In other words, it underlines 
that the corporate–state relations are shaped by historical conditions. To illustrate, when 
economic crisis hits, the state loses its legitimacy. This is when the state becomes more 
dependent on the recovery of the economy to reclaim its revenue and legitimacy by serving the 
interests of business community to a larger extent (O’Connor 1973; Poulantzas 1973; Prechel 
1990, 2003). This is also when political mobilization of corporate America becomes more 
aggressive in looking for alternative leeway for crucial resources, especially capital and access to 
markets (Prechel 1990, 2000; Akard 1992; Prechel and Morris 2010). 
In summary, organizational political economy framework analyzes the historical contingency 
of the interdependent corporate–state relations in the reconfiguration of political–legal and 
organizational arrangements, which in turn shape organizational structure and behavior. To be 
sure, organizational political economy is not a simple rejection of current lines of theory. For 
instance, the increasing organizational complexity of financial institutions developed in the 
1990s and 2000s as a consequence of the changes in political–legal and organizational 
arrangements is well in line with the high complexity argument and the vertical integration 
argument. Instead, organizational political economy framework incorporates the political 
sociology tradition of power analysis into organization theories such as resource dependence 
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theory and institutionalism. The merit of this framework for the examination of securitization, 
however, lies in the notion that (1) it overcomes the weakness of the one-sided focus either on 
the state or on the financial sector and (2) it calls for a historical investigation of corporate–state 
relations in the reconfiguration of the political–legal and organizational arrangements related to 
securitization. 
Changes in Political–Legal and Organizational Arrangements Related to Securitization 
There are three particularly important political–legal and organizational arrangements making 
securitization legal, viable, and favorable for banks that will be addressed below: (1) the attack 
on Glass–Steagall that allows banks to enter the securities market in the first place, (2) the use of 
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) in securitization by banks, and (3) regulatory capital 
requirement whose design provides incentives for banks to engage in securitization (Kwan 1997; 
Prechel 2000, 2003; Levitt 2002; Morris 2005; Gotham 2006; Johnson and Kwak 2010; Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 2012; Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez 2013; Prechel and Hou 2016). It should 
be noted that the first two arrangements are widely cited in sociological research on 
financialization and securitization and I provide a summary in the following paragraphs. The 
design of regulatory capital requirement, however, has yet received sufficient attention in 
sociology literature. In the following, I outline the historical changes in these three arrangements 
in order. 
Glass–Steagall separated commercial banks (hereinafter banks) from investment banking. 
Banks were restricted in dealing with certain types of government bonds. Since the 1980s, in 
face of declined profitability and competitiveness, banks asked for the access to the securities 
market prohibited by Glass–Steagall. In the early 1980s, the banking industry represented by the 
American Bankers Association and the U.S. League of Savings Institutions lobbied the Senate to 
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permit banks to underwrite MBS (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1984). The Senate bill (S 
1821) included this provision but the final bill, the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement 
Act of 1984, only allowed banks to purchase private-label MBS (Gotham 2006; McCoy and 
Renuart 2008; Beer and Faulkner 2011; Prechel and Hou 2016). Still, as its name suggests, the 
bill marked the first success of the banking industry in that banks won the access to the market of 
private-label securities. Later, while they could not find further support from Congress, banks 
pivoted to the Federal Reserve. In 1986, under the pressure of the banking industry, the Federal 
Reserve permitted securities subsidiaries of bank holding companies to underwrite and deal 
specific securities as long as such underwritings made up less than 5% of the subsidiary revenue. 
This is a loophole in Glass–Steagall (specifically, Section 20 of the Banking Act of 1933), which 
separated banks from any organization “engaged principally” in securities underwriting and 
dealing. Over the next few years, this loophole was enlarged to include more types of securities 
allowed, such as consumer receivable-related securities (Boemio and Edwards 1989:662). The 
5% limit was also raised to 10% in 1989 and 25% in 1996 under the pressure of the banking 
industry (Kwan 1997; Prechel 2000; Johnson and Kwak 2010). In this way, banks gradually 
dismantled Glass–Steagall, which was designed to keep banks from high risk, and became major 
participants in the securities market that introduced high risk into their portfolios. 
While the attack on Glass–Steagall paved the way for banks to engage in securitization by 
redefining political–legal arrangements, SPVs provided convenient and favorable organizational 
arrangements. It is well documented that banks set up SPVs, which are usually organized as off-
balance-sheet partnerships subject to loose oversight, to engage in securitization activities 
(Prechel and Morris 2010; Rona-Tas and Hiss 2010; MacKenzie 2011; Cetorelli and Peristiani 
2012; Taylor and Wolak 2012). The accounting treatment of SPVs has great implication on its 
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wide use in the banking industry. The accounting guidelines, issued by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB)1, allows the sponsor of SPVs (banks) to own up to 97% of the SPV 
capital without consolidating it. In other words, banks are able to keep SPVs off-balance-sheet 
and subject to virtually no oversight as long as they own less than 97% of the SPV, in sharp 
contrast to the common understanding of consolidation rules regarding ownership. This “3% 
ownership rule” was first introduced in 1990 as Emerging Issues Task Force Issue No. 90-15 
(EITF 90-15). Originally it only applied to certain leasing activities, but corporate America 
quickly took advantage of it to all types of SPVs (Ketz 2003:141). This 3% ownership rule was 
further formalized in Financial Accounting Standard No. 125 (FAS 126) in 1996. FAS 140, 
which replaced FAS 125 in 2000, kept this rule unchanged. Levitt (2002:140) shows that while 
the FASB tried to establish tighter accounting standard for SPVs, financial lobbying halted the 
attempt. It was until the Enron scandal and the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 that 
the FASB revised the 3% ownership rule to 10% (i.e., the sponsor of SPVs can own up to 90% of 
the SPV capital without consolidating on their balance sheet) in 2003 in FASB Interpretation No. 
46 Revised (FIN46(R)). Still, it “created three loopholes to allow business entities a way out” 
(Ketz 2003:143). Due to their favorable accounting treatment, SPVs are widely used in corporate 
America for tax purposes and to boost on-balance-sheet profit (Prechel 2000, 2016). 
Yet another favorable arrangement related to securitization comes from regulatory capital 
requirement, which remains unnoticed in sociology literature. The United States adopted the 
                                                 
1 The FASB is not a government agency. Instead, it is an independent, private-sector, not-for-profit 
organization. Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC was 
authorized to establish standards of financial statement and accounting. However, the SEC delegated this 
responsibility to the FASB. 
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international risk-based capital accord (Basel I) in 1988 and required full compliance of 
commercial banks by the end of 1992. In this risk-based regulatory capital requirement 
algorithm, different risk weights are assigned to different categories of assets to calculate risk-
weighted asset. Risk weight in Basel I measures the credit risk (risk of default) of relevant bank 
assets. The algorithm assigns risk weights as follows: Cash and U.S. Treasury bonds are assigned 
0% risk weight, some MBS and claims collateralized by Treasury 20% risk weight, mortgages 
50% risk weight, and all other (e.g., corporate loans) 100% risk weight. Banks are required to 
hold certain amount of risk-based regulatory capital that acts as a safety cushion in times of 
stress against risk-weighted assets.2 Basel I set the minimum total risk-based capital ratio (ratio 
of total risk-based regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets) at 8%. 
The design of differentiated risk weights has great implication on securitization, in that 
securitized assets are assigned a lower risk weight compared to their underlying assets, therefore 
a smaller amount of capital is required to hold against securities compared to assets like 
mortgages and loans. In addition, certain securities such as subprime MBS are given distorted 
high ratings by rating agencies (Rona-Tas and Hiss 2010) and therefore assigned even lower risk 
weight, in spite of the high risk they carry.3 With lower risk weight assigned and less regulatory 
capital needed, securities become more favorable for banks to hold on their asset side. Holding 
securities pushes capital ratios up (by lowering the denominator of the risk-based capital ratio), 
                                                 
2 This is a simplified description of the calculation of risk-weighted asset and regulatory capital. Full 
details can be found in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988). 
3 For example, AAA-rated MBS is assigned a 20% risk weight while A-rated MBS is assigned a 50% risk 
weight. A distorted higher rating may help private-label securities assigned a lower risk weight and 
therefore ask for lower regulatory capital to be held against. 
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gives banks more room to unlock capital for their own use, and therefore reduces their capital 
constraint. This is indeed what banks do. In the October 1992 volume of U.S. Banker, a leading 
bank management publication, an article ran as follows:  
Imagine a situation where your bank has made a $5 million loan… You’re eager to get 
the loan off your books to avoid having to carry full risk-weighted capital against it… 
Transforming loans into securities removes blocks of risk from bank balance sheets, 
boosts capital ratios, creates fee income and generates funds for more lending (Marshall 
1992). 
Moreover, off-balance-sheet assets, the vast majority of which are securities, are treated more 
favorably in the regulatory capital requirement formula. They are additionally assigned “credit 
conversion factors,” smaller than one. Credit conversion factor is the probability of off-balance-
sheet exposures become a credit exposure and shift onto the balance sheet. Under this 
arrangement, given the 8% minimum total capital ratio established by Basel I, $100 of off-
balance-sheet securities, which are assigned a credit conversion factor of 0.5 and a risk weight of 
50%, asks for a minimum total risk-based regulatory capital of $2 ($100 × 0.5 × 50% × 8% = 
$2). By comparison, the same amount of on-balance-sheet loans, assuming a risk weight of 
100%, asks for a minimum total risk-based regulatory capital of $8 ($100 × 100% × 8% = $8) 
while the same amount of on-balance-sheet securities holdings, assuming a risk weight of 50%, 
asks for a minimum total risk-based regulatory capital of $4 ($100 × 50% × 8% = $4). In this 
way, the design of risk-based regulatory capital requirement, where the amounts of regulatory 
capital needed to hold against on-balance-sheet loans and mortgages, on-balance-sheet securities, 
and off-balance-sheet securities, each lower than the next, provide incentives for banks to 
securitize their on-balance-sheet assets and maneuver assets from balance sheet to off-balance-
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sheet SPVs (Jones 2000; Acharya and Richardson 2009; Johnson and Kwak 2010; Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine 2012). 
Banks engage in two broad forms of securitization: (1) holdings of securities and (2) 
securitization activities.4 The three major changes in political–legal and organizational 
arrangements elaborated above have significant implications on securitization in the banking 
industry. First, banks invest in and hold various categories of securities on their balance sheet. 
Recall that while holding securities issued by government agencies is legal under Glass–Steagall 
and has long been common practice in the banking industry, holding private-label securities is 
only possible with the expansion of securities market and banks’ political effort to gradually 
overturn the New Deal regulatory regime and win the full access to the securities market. At the 
year end of 2007, the banking industry reported $2,023.59 billion of holdings of securities, 
making up 18.86% of total assets. Within this $2,023.59 billion, private-label securities made up 
more than one-third of all holdings of securities (see Chapter 4 for more statistics). Holding 
securities helps reduce capital constraint for banks, because securitized assets are assigned a 
lower risk weight compared to assets such as mortgages and loans, thus asking for a lower 
regulatory capital. Second, banks themselves engage in securitization activities that were 
prohibited under Glass–Steagall, acting like investment banks and selling and securitizing assets. 
Banks’ involvement in securitization activities is also a result of the expansion of securities 
market and their political mobilization in the last quarter of the 20th century. Unlike holding 
                                                 
4 Note the term “securitization activities” refers to a specific type of securitization and will be extensively 
used in the coming chapters. The use of the term “securitization activities” is consistent with the Federal 
Reserve. In its FR Y-9C form, banks are asked to report their activities of selling and securitizing assets 
such as mortgages, credit card receivables, and commercial loans as “securitization activities” in Schedule 
HC-S (Securitization and Asset Sale Activities). See Chapter 3 for more details. 
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securities on their balance sheet, securitization activities typically involve the use of off-balance-
sheet SPVs, suggesting the role of increasing organizational complexity in securitization. 
Moreover, off-balance-sheet assets in practice get even more favorable treatment in regulatory 
capital requirement algorithm compared to on-balance-sheet securitized assets and ask for even 
lower regulatory capital to be held against. 
Hypotheses on Organizational Causes of Securitization 
In light of organizational political economy framework and historical contextualization, I 
argue there are three organizational causes of the increasing engagement in securitization of the 
banking industry: capital dependence, organizational complexity, and political activity. In the 
following, I elaborate the three organizational causes with the help of a revisit of the conceptual 
framework and historical contextualization. I then present hypotheses on how these 
organizational causes affect securitization of banks for the regression analysis. 
Organizational political economy framework suggests that banks are dependent on critical 
resources such as capital and property rights that are largely controlled and regulated by the state. 
This leads to the first set of hypotheses, which tests how capital constraint affects banks’ 
securitization activities. 
Since the late 1970s, the banking industry successfully redefined the political–legal 
arrangements and gradually gained the full access to the securities market. Securitization became 
a means to advance its profitability agenda by helping banks reduce capital dependence and 
increase autonomy. Therefore, it is expected that banks with lower profitability will be more 
active in securitization. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a. Profitability is negatively associated with banks’ engagement in 
securitization.  
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Regulatory capital is an important form of capital constraint banks face. A higher risk-based 
capital ratio means the bank in question holds a higher amount of regulatory capital against its 
risk-weighted assets. Although risk-based capital ratio is widely cited as a soundness indicator of 
banks by regulatory agencies, the higher the better, a high risk-based capital ratio, givens it 
surpasses the minimum threshold of 8%, imposes a higher capital constraint for banks. In other 
words, banks have more room to reduce their regulatory capital when they are having a higher 
risk-based capital ratio, as long as that ratio stays well above 8%. The lower risk weight assigned 
to securities provides incentives for banks to engage in securitization by holding more securities 
on their balance sheet. Moreover, the even more favorable treatment of off-balance-sheet assets 
adds more incentives for banks to engage in securitization activities such as selling and 
securitizing mortgages and credit card receivables via off-balance-sheet SPVs. Therefore, banks 
are expected to be more active in securitization when having a higher risk-based capital ratio. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b. Risk-based capital ratio is positively associated with banks’ engagement in 
securitization. 
An important consequence of the changes in organizational arrangements is the increase of 
organizational complexity of bank holding companies. As banks get more access and participate 
in multiple markets both across state boundaries and across business lines, they not only become 
larger but also more complex in terms of number of subsidiaries and partnerships and number of 
layers within their organizational hierarchy (Guillen and Suarez 2010). For example, Avraham, 
Selvaggi, and Vickery (2012) report that at the end of 2011, there were 2,365 domestic 
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subsidiaries5 of bank holding companies under the “securities, commodity contracts, and other” 
category in the U.S. banking industry, adding to the organizational complexity of banks (Prechel 
and Morris 2010; Prechel and Hou 2016; Prechel and Zheng 2016). The second set of hypotheses 
tests the relationship between organizational complexity and banks’ engagement in 
securitization. 
While there was only one bank holding company with more than 1,000 subsidiaries in 1990, 
all of the top six bank holding companies had more than 1,000 subsidiaries in 2012 (Avraham et 
al 2012). These subsidiaries engage in securities, asset management, insurance business, among 
others, which were previously prohibited under Glass–Steagall and the Bank Holding Company 
Act. A significant part of the entities within bank hierarchy are off-balance-sheet SPVs, which 
are typically organized as off-balance-sheet partnerships, nested in various types of subsidiaries 
of banks. As securitization becomes a new and legitimate practice in the banking industry, SPVs 
become the facilitator in the vertically integrated structure for banks to engage in securitization 
activities (Prechel 2003; Davis 2009; Abolafia 2010; Fligstein and Goldstein 2010; Palmer and 
                                                 
5 Note that Avraham et al (2012) use “subsidiary” in a loosely defined way, covering all entities within 
the organizational hierarchy of bank holding companies including partnerships, which are not subsidiaries 
in terms of ownership. In my analysis in the following chapters, I use “entity” to refer to both subsidiaries 
and partnerships of bank holding companies. Data on organizational complexity used in Avraham et al 
(2012), as well as those used in this dissertation, come from FR Y-10 (Report of Changes in 
Organizational Structure), which records all the entities within the organizational hierarchy of bank 
holding companies. These entities include: Commercial Bank, Cooperative Bank, Credit Union, 
Edge/Agreement Corporation, Financial Holding Company, Holding Company, Industrial Bank, 
Insurance Co. Broker/Agent/Underwriter, Nondepository Trust Company, Other Company, Savings 
Bank, Savings and Loan Association, the Securities Broker/Dealer/Underwriter, Farm Credit System 
Institution, and Savings and Loan Holding Company. See Chapter 3 for more details. 
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Maher 2010). In addition, the favorable accounting treatment of SPVs (i.e., the sponsor can own 
up to 97% or 90% of SPV asset without consolidating it) makes securitization via SPVs an 
attractive mechanism for banks to hide excessive risk and circumvent regulatory capital (Jones 
2000; Prechel 2003; Calomiris and Mason 2004; Higgins and Mason 2004; Johnson and Kwak 
2010; Taylor and Wolak 2012; Acharya et al 2013). 
It is expected that a bank with higher complexity, measured by number of layers and number 
of entities within its hierarchy, is more active in securitization, especially in off-balance-sheet 
securitization activities via SPVs. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a. Number of layers within the organizational hierarchy is positively associated 
with banks’ engagement in securitization. 
Hypothesis 2b. Number of entities within the organizational hierarchy is positively 
associated with banks’ engagement in securitization. 
Since the 1980s, as banks get larger and more complex, they also become more concentrated 
and powerful. These large bank conglomerates are members of the new power bloc in the U.S. 
economy (Davis 2009; Johnson and Kwak 2010; Prechel and Hou 2016). They were able to 
exercise power in the policy formation process that made securitization legal, viable, and 
favorable, as illustrated above. The last hypothesis tests the relationship between political 
activity and securitization.  
Lobbying is a key mechanism for corporate America to influence policy formation process 
(Mizruchi 1989; Boies and Prechel 2002; Prechel and Morris 2010). One of the most influential 
consequences of the changes in political–legal and organizational arrangements promoted by the 
lobbying effort of the banking industry is that there is no barrier left for a financial institution to 
act as a commercial bank, an investment bank, and an insurance company at the same time. At 
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the turn of the 21st century, the landscape of the U.S. banking industry is featured by 
conglomerates such as Citicorp and JPMorgan Chase (Campbell 2010; Schneiberg and Bartley 
2010). Moreover, after the passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act in 1999 and the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act in 2000, which officially overturn the New Deal regulatory regime, 
banks kept lobbying for more preferential treatment in their businesses, including securitization 
(Igan, Michra, and Tressel 2009; Johnson and Kwak 2010). It is expected that banks who are 
more active in lobbying are those who engage in securitization more actively, especially off-
balance-sheet securitization activities via SPVs. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. Bank’s lobbying expenditure is positively associated with its engagement in 
securitization. 
Concluding Remarks 
To summarize, this chapter elaborates and employs organizational political economy 
framework in the analysis of securitization. With the help of this conceptual framework, I review 
the historical reconfiguration of three specific political–legal and organizational arrangements, 
which makes securitization legal, viable, and favorable for banks to engage in. The historical 
contextualization helps identify three organizational causes of banks’ increasing engagement in 
securitization: capital dependence, organizational complexity, and political activity. Three 






This chapter reports the setting of study group, data source, and measures of variables in 
preparation for the descriptive statistics and regression analysis in the following two chapters.  
Study Group 
The study group of the analysis is bank holding companies in the U.S. from 2001 to 2007. 
Bank holding companies are required to file their financial statements to the Federal Reserve 
through FR Y-9C form (Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies, 
commonly known as “Call Report”) by federal law. Therefore, the population of bank holding 
companies are those who file FR Y-9C reports.6 
The selection of 2001 as the beginning year has both substantive and technical considerations. 
First, the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000 marked the final victory of over two decades of financial deregulation for the banking 
industry. Banks in the new millennium fully enjoy the free pass to expand their business lines in 
a lightly regulated environment. Second, the report of securitization activities and regulatory 
capital by bank holding companies to the Federal Reserve became mandatory since 2001. 
Starting from March 2001, bank holding companies are required to report their securitization 
activities in a newly developed Schedule HC-S (Servicing, Securitization, and Asset Sales 
Activities) and their regulatory capital in another newly added Schedule HC-R (Regulatory 
                                                 
6 The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago provides raw data of FR Y-9C on its website: https://www. 
chicagofed.org/applications/bhc/bhc-home. 
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Capital) as part of FR Y-9C form. In other words, measure of one form of securitization and one 
key explanatory variable are only available since 2001. The second half of 2007 marked the 
outset of the financial crisis, featured by the collapse of MBS market. The environment in which 
the banking industry and the state are embedded in is categorically different since then. 
Therefore, 2007 is selected as the end of the study. In this way, the analysis examines the extent 
to which banks engaged in securitization before the financial crisis and speaks to how the 
accumulated risk in the banking industry brought about by unregulated securitization contributed 
to the crisis. 
In addition, as the population of bank holding companies that file FR Y-9C changes over time 
due to bankruptcy and merger and acquisition, as well as reporting threshold change in 2006 (see 
below), to keep the study group consistent, the regression analysis in Chapter 5 includes the 418 
bank holding companies whose total assets are constantly higher than $500 million from 2001 to 
2007. Appendix A lists the name of these 418 bank holding companies. 
The selection of $500 million threshold has the following considerations. First, in March 
2006, the total assets threshold for bank holding companies to file FR Y-9C raised from $150 
million to $500 million. Therefore, there was a sharp decrease in population size (bank holding 
companies that file FR Y-9C) from 2,310 in 2005 to 986 in 2006. Second, for bank holding 
companies with less than $500 million total assets, their holdings of securities and securitization 
activities made up a small fraction of those of all bank holding companies. For example, in 2005, 
the last year when bank holding companies with total assets less than $500 million but more than 
$150 million were mandated to file FR Y-9C, their holdings of securities made up 4.40% of all 
bank holding companies, and their outstanding principal balance of securitization activities made 
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up 0.04% of all bank holding companies (see below for more details on measures of holdings of 
securities and securitization activities). 
Bank holding companies with total assets more than $500 million are further categorized into 
four peer groups by their total assets, as defined by the quarterly Bank Holding Company 
Performance Report (BHCPR) published by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC).7 Peer Group 1 includes bank holding companies with $10 billion asset or 
higher. Peer Group 2 includes bank holding companies with assets between $3 billion and $10 
billion. Peer Group 3 includes bank holding companies with assets between $1 billion and $3 
billion. Peer Group 4 includes bank holding companies with assets between $500 million and $1 
billion. Each BHCPR lists all the bank holding companies by peer group at the end of the report 
for that quarter.  
BHCPRs also list a Peer Group 9, including atypical and 2nd tier bank holding companies. A 
bank holding company is included in this group if (1) it does not consolidate financial statements 
for all subsidiaries; (2) it has significant non-bank activities; (3) its parent company is itself a 
bank; or (4) its operations deviate significantly from other holding companies in the same size 
category (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2017). In other words, bank 
holding companies in this group are either a subsidiary of another bank holding company in 
other peer groups (e.g., Wells Fargo Financial Services and JPMorgan Equity Holdings) or those 
significantly engaging in non-bank activities (e.g., MetLife and Charles Schwab). BHCPRs 
exclude bank holding companies in Peer Group 9 when calculating summary statistics. 
                                                 
7 BHCPRs are available through the National Information Center (NIC) website of Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council: https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/content/BHCPRRPT/ 
BHCPR_Peer.htm. 
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Following this practice, the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 also excludes atypical and 2nd tier bank 
holding companies. 
Figure 1 reports the number of bank holding companies by peer group from 2001 to 2007. 
Total number of bank holding companies in Peer Groups 1 to 4 climbed from 589 to 840 during 
this period, due to inflation, industry consolidation, and asset growth. However, this increase was 
largely contributed by bank holding companies in Peer Groups 2, 3, and 4, while the number of 
bank holding companies in Peer Group 1 barely changed. 
Securitization: Data Source and Measures 
As discussed in Chapter 2, banks engage in two forms of securitization: holdings of securities 
and securitization activities. Two groups of measures are accordingly developed to examine 
securitization in the U.S. banking industry. The first group measures holdings of securities on 
banks’ balance sheet, including their trading account. The second measures securitization 
activities both on- and off-balance-sheet; it captures the information on assets that have been sold 
and securitized by bank holding companies. The data source to build these two groups of 
measures is various schedules in FR Y-9C.  
For the first group of measure of holdings of securities, the data source to build measures 
includes Schedules HC-B (Securities) and HC-D (Trading Assets and Liabilities) in FR Y-9C. 
Schedule HC-B reports various categories of securities (e.g., U.S. Treasury securities, pass-
through securities guaranteed by GSEs, asset-backed securities) bank holding companies hold. 
Schedule HC-D reports various securities on the trading book of bank holding companies. For 
securities from Schedule HC-B (Securities), I use amortized cost for held-to-maturity securities 
and fair value for available-to-sale securities. For securities from  
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Figure 1 Number of Bank Holding Companies by Peer Group, 2001–2007 
Source: BHCPR.
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Schedule HC-D (Trading Assets and Liabilities), I use fair value. This is consistent with common 
practice in accounting practice.8  
I distinguish three categories of securities held by bank holding companies on their balance 
sheet: (1) securities issued by private institutions (hereinafter “private-label securities”), (2) 
securities issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac (hereinafter “GSE securities”),9 and (3) securities issued by government 
entities, including federal, state, and local governments (hereinafter “government securities”). 
Recall that banks were not allowed to hold private-label securities under Glass–Steagall. 
Therefore, this categorization is substantial and will help me to detect possible difference across 
banks’ behavior and strategy of holding different categories of securities. In addition, Schedule 
HC-B (Securities) in FR Y-9C lists various kinds of securities held by banks, allowing me to 
develop measures for the three categories of securities discussed above. Appendix B details the 
items and their corresponding data mnemonics in FR Y-9C for the calculation of the three 
measures: holdings of private-label securities, holdings of government securities, and holdings of 
GSE securities. Note these three measures capture the absolute size (in dollar amount) of 
holdings of securities. I also include three corresponding measures that capture the relative size 
of holdings of securities, calculated as the holdings of that category of securities as a percentage 
of banks’ total assets.  
                                                 
8 For example, Schedule HC (Consolidated Balance Sheet) in FR Y-9C only presents amortized cost of 
held-to-maturity securities and fair value of available-for-sale securities as summary measures.  
9 GSEs like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are publicly chartered by the U.S. Congress but privately 
owned. GSE securities do not carry explicit government guarantee. However, lenders and buyers assume 
an “implicit guarantee” that government would not allow them to default on debt. The subprime mortgage 
crisis is largely the result of this implicit guarantee.  
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The data source to measure securitization activities is Schedule HC-S (Servicing, 
Securitization, and Asset Sale Activities) in FR Y-9C. Schedule HC-S reports outstanding 
principal balance of assets sold and securitized by the following underlying assets: (1) 1–4 
family residential loans, (2) home equity lines, (3) credit card receivables, (4) auto loans, (5) 
other consumer loans, (6) commercial and industrial loans, and (7) all other loans, all other 
leases, and all other assets. Total outstanding principal balance of all assets securitized and sold 
is used as the major measure of securitization activities. I do not separate securitization activities 
by underlying asset, considering not a lot of banks engage in securitization activities and 
outstanding principal balances of most types of assets securitized and sold are small. Descriptive 
statistics in Chapter 4 offer more details on this. Appendix B provides the items and their 
corresponding data mnemonics in FR Y-9C for the calculation of total outstanding principal 
balance of all assets securitized and sold. In the same vein as holdings of securities, I also 
include a relative measure of securitization activities, which is calculated as the total outstanding 
principal balance of all assets securitized and sold as a percentage of banks’ total assets. 
Explanatory and Control Variables: Data Source and Measures 
For the explanatory variables in the first set of hypotheses (capital dependence), profitability 
is measured by net interest margin (NIM), which is calculated by the ratio of net interest income 
(investment returns minus interest expense) to interest-earning asset (such as loans, leases, and 
securities).10 Net interest income and income loss are collected from Schedule HI (Consolidated 
Income Statement) in FR Y-9C. Various interest-earning assets are collected from Schedule HC 
                                                 
10 See St. Louis Federal Reserve on the details of calculation of net interest margin: https://fred. 
stlouisfed.org/series/USNIM. 
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(Consolidated Balance Sheet) in FR Y-9C. Risk-based capital ratio is collected from Schedule 
HC-R (Regulatory Capital) in FR Y-9C, which is measured by the ratio of total risk-based capital 
(Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital) to average total assets for leverage capital purposes. 
For the explanatory variables in the second set of hypotheses (organizational complexity), the 
data source is FR Y-10 (Report of Changes in Organizational Structure) reported by bank 
holding companies to the Federal Reserve. While FR Y-10 only records quarterly changes in 
banks’ organizational structure, the FFIEC provides hierarchy reports of bank holding companies 
at any given date based on FR Y-10.11 I use the hierarchy reports of the last day of calendar year 
(31 December) from 2001 to 2007 to collect organizational complexity variables. Hierarchy 
reports include names of all entities within the hierarchy of a bank holding companies, as well as 
the direct parent entity of each entity. Therefore, one can calculate the number of entities in the 
hierarchy and the number of layers of entity of a bank holding company from hierarchy reports. 
It is worth noting that hierarchy reports also include limited partnerships (LP), limited liability 
partnerships (LLP), and limited liability companies (LLC). Recall that SPVs are often formed as 
off-balance-sheet partnerships including LP and LLP. 
For the explanatory variables in the last hypothesis (political activity), data of lobbying 
expenditure is collected from OpenSecrets.org, the website of the Center for Responsive Politics 
(CRP). CRP collects, cleanses, and summarizes lobbying data from U.S. Senate’s Lobbying 
Disclosure Act Database.  
Appendix C summarizes operationalization of explanatory variables. 
                                                 
11 The FFIEC provides hierarchy reports through its NIC website: https://www.ffiec.gov/ 
nicpubweb/nicweb/SearchForm.aspx. 
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I also include several control variables. First, according to population ecology theory, 
organizational inertia increases with age and might have an impact on corporate behavior 
(Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984). Bank age is therefore included as a control variable. Second, 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency suggests that banks might be exposed to risk 
specific to geographic area (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 1997). Therefore, district 
dummies are introduced to control for the presence, if any, of regional difference in 
securitization. In specific, Federal Reserve has twelve Districts12; district dummies are assigned 
the value of one if the bank holding company is headquartered in that Federal Reserve District 
and the value of zero if not. Third, year dummies are included to control for any time effect, as a 
common practice in panel data analysis. All these control variables are collected or calculated 
from FR Y-9C items; Appendix C presents their operationalization.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the dependent, explanatory, and control variables 
discussed above. Note the high skewness and kurtosis values in Table 1; to reduce skewness, all 
numerical variables are log-transformed.13 Table 2 reports the correlation matrix. Explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year, as will be used in the regression analysis, considering it takes 
time for explanatory variables to have effect on dependent variables. Chapter 5 presents further 
elaboration on models.  
  
                                                 
12 For the twelve Federal Reserve Districts, see: https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/ 
federal-reserve-system.htm. 
13 A variable “var” is log-transformed to “logvar” by  logvar ln var 1   if its minimum value is 0. For 
variables with negative values, the log-transformed values are set at 0. This only affects one bank holding 
company and the exclusion of it does not affect the results. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Holdings of private-label securities  
(in billions) 
0.00  174.25   0.88   7.08  13.78 248.12 
Holdings of private-label securities 
as a percentage of total assets 
0.00  42.07   2.01   3.77  4.33 30.36 
Holdings of GSE securities (in billions) 0.00  203.63   1.44   9.14  13.84 241.88 
Holdings of GSE securities 
as a percentage of total assets 
0.00  70.55   9.13   8.69  1.74 7.98 
Holdings of government securities  
(in billions) 
0.00  80.31   0.89   4.81  11.27 148.13 
Holdings of government securities 
as a percentage of total assets 
0.00  51.49   10.86   8.23  1.42 5.72 
Outstanding principal of securitization 
activities (in billions) 
0.00 647.54 2.47 24.21 14.90 281.94 
Outstanding principal of securitization 
activities as a percentage of total assets 
0.00 207.22 1.18 7.26 13.65 287.24 
Net interest margin –0.73 11.07 5.36 1.27 –0.05 5.04 
Risk-based capital ratio –9.63 43.59 13.46 3.70 2.38 17.45 
Number of layers 2.00 15.00 3.50 1.44 2.70 15.28 
Number of entities 2.00 2,972.00 34.26 171.21 10.94 148.11 
Lobbying expenditure (in thousands) 0.00 8,560.00 44.21 441.80 13.86 211.60 
Age 0.00 95.00 20.05 11.23 1.70 10.08 
       
       
Note: Author’s tabulation using FR Y-9C and CRP/OpenSecret.org data.    
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix  
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. 
Holdings of private-label 
securities (log) 
             
2. 
Holdings of private-label 
securities as a percentage of  
total assets (log) 
0.75             
3. Holdings of GSE securities (log) 0.46 0.28            
4. 
Holdings of GSE securities 
as a percentage of total assets (log) 
0.29 0.21 0.75           
5. 
Holdings of government securities 
(log) 
0.33 0.18 0.32 –0.02          
6. 
Holdings of government securities 
as a percentage of total assets (log) 
–0.18 –0.13 –0.28 –0.19 0.42         
7. 
Outstanding principal of 
securitization activities (log)  
0.33 0.19 0.31 0.02 0.39 –0.22        
8. 
Outstanding principal of 
securitization activities as a 
percentage of total assets (log) 
0.24 0.15 0.22 –0.03 0.29 –0.18 0.88       
9. 
Net interest margin  
(last year, log) 
–0.14 –0.18 –0.11 –0.13 –0.16 –0.13 –0.07 –0.03      
10. 
Risk-based capital ratio  
(last year, log) 
–0.11 –0.02 –0.12 0.09 –0.04 0.27 –0.21 –0.13 0.22     
11. Number of layers (last year, log) 0.37 0.21 0.46 0.15 0.37 –0.26 0.47 0.45 –0.09 –0.12    
12. Number of entities (last year, log) 0.44 0.24 0.51 0.11 0.49 –0.34 0.58 0.51 –0.06 –0.21 0.77   
13. 
Lobbying expenditure  
(last year, log) 
0.32 0.21 0.31 0.02 0.42 –0.15 0.52 0.43 –0.10 –0.18 0.43 0.57  
14. Age (log) 0.07 –0.02 0.09 –0.03 0.25 –0.02 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.33 0.21 
 
Note: Author’s tabulation using FR Y-9C and CRP/OpenSecret.org data. 
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Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I set up the study group for the regression analysis as the U.S. bank holding 
companies that constantly report total assets higher than $500 million from 2001 to 2007. There 
are 418 bank holding companies that meet this standard. I also present data sources and measures 
for various forms of securitization, including holdings of private-label securities, holdings of 
government securities, holdings of GSE securities, and outstanding principal balance of 
securitization activities. I include both absolute measures (in dollar amount) and relative 
measures (as a percentage of total assets) of securitization in my analysis. Explanatory variables 
corresponding to the hypotheses raised in last chapter, as well as control variables, are also 
introduced.  
In the next two chapters, I report the results from descriptive analysis (Chapter 4) and 
regression analysis (Chapter 5) on securitization. Chapter 4 analyzes the measures of various 
forms of securitization proposed in this chapter, providing a closer look at securitization over 
years and across peer groups. These variables measuring different forms of securitization are 
further developed into dependent variables in the regression analysis, where they are analyzed 
against explanatory variables discussed above to test the hypotheses. I leave the details on the 
models used in regression analysis to Chapter 5, considering the multiple dependent variables 
take various forms statistically.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF MEASURES OF SECURITIZATION 
 
In this chapter, I report the descriptive statistics of the measures of securitization—holdings of 
securities (including private-label, GSE, and government securities) and securitization 
activities—proposed in Chapter 3 over time and across peer groups. On one hand, these 
descriptive statistics instantiate the historical contextualization in Chapter 2 by quantitatively 
showing the degree in which banks engage in various forms of securitization. On the other hand, 
these descriptive statistics offer more insights on various forms of securitization, which will be 
further developed into dependent variables used in the regression analysis in Chapter 5.  
Holdings of Securities  
This section presents the descriptive statistics of holdings of three categories of securities, 
both in absolute and in relative terms: (1) holdings of private-label securities (securities issued by 
private institutions), (2) holdings of GSE securities (securities issued or guaranteed by 
government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and (3) holdings of 
government securities (securities issued by government entities, including federal, state, and 
local governments). 
Figure 2 documents the longitudinal trend of holdings of the three categories of securities of 
the whole U.S. banking industry. From 2001 to 2007, holdings of private-label securities 
increased more than twofold from $318.53 billion to $676.49 billion, making it the most rapidly 
growing category among the three. Holdings of government securities climbed from $387.04 
billion in 2001 to $577.33 billion in 2005, an all-time high, before surpassed by holdings of
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Note: Author’s tabulation using FR Y-9C data.   
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private-label securities. Holdings of GSE securities expanded from $599.98 billion in 2001 to 
$823.14 billion in 2004 and then leveled off.  
The remarkable increase of holdings of private-label securities, especially after 2004, deserves 
a more detailed discussion. First, the expansion of the securities market provides more supply of 
private-label securities for banks to invest in. In particular, 2004 through 2006 witnessed a 
dramatic growth in the origination of subprime mortgage, most of which were securitized into 
MBS (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011:70), adding more supply to the private-
label securities market. Second, compared to government and GSE securities, private-label 
securities, especially those with underlying asset of subprime mortgages, involve higher risk. 
Therefore, the remarkable increase of holdings of private-label securities means that risk is 
rapidly accumulated in the banking industry. Third, although private-label securities involve 
higher risk, rating agencies, which were paid by securities issuers, lifted the ratings of private-
label securities favorably (Rona-Tas and Hiss 2010). As illustrated in Chapter 2, the distorted 
high ratings of private-label securities are translated into lower risk weight in the regulatory 
capital algorithm, asking for a lower amount of regulatory capital. This provides additional 
incentives for banks to invest in private-label securities to reap profit and alleviate capital 
constraint.  
Among all 2,926 bank-year observations in the study group defined in Chapter 3 (418 banks × 
7 years = 2,926 bank-year observations), a very small number report zero holding of government 
securities (ten) or GSE securities (ninety-two). When combining government and GSE securities, 
which sometimes are lumped and referred to as “agency securities,” all banks from 2001 to 2007 
report non-zero holdings. This suggests that holding government and GSE securities has been a 
common practice for banks. 
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However, a smaller subset of bank holding companies reports non-zero private-label 
securities from 2001 to 2007. Figure 3 shows the percentage of bank holding companies that 
report non-zero private-label securities from 2001 to 2007 by peer group. It suggests that 
engagement in private-label securities holdings is negatively related to bank size. While more 
than 95% of the largest bank holding companies (those in Peer Group 1) report non-zero private-
label securities, the percentage drops as bank size decreases. Among the smallest bank holding 
companies in the study group (those in Peer Group 4), only around two-thirds hold private-label 
securities. Compared to holding government and GSE securities, holding private-label securities 
is part of the new business model for banks. The expansion of securities market, together with 
active political mobilization by the banking industry to win full access to the securities market, 
presents opportunities for banks to invest in private-label securities. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, it was the large and powerful banks who are more active in this process. They have 
become financial conglomerates and involved in multiple lines of business, including the new 
opportunities of investing in private-label securities. 
Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 demonstrate the absolute size (in dollar amount) of holdings 
of the private-label, GSE, and government securities, respectively, in the study group by peer 
group from 2001 to 2007. It is not surprising that the largest banks (those in Peer Group 1) 
consistently make up the largest portion of holdings across all three categories considering their 
sheer size. However, it is worth noting that private-label securities are more concentrated in the 
largest banks (those in Peer Group 1), compared to GSE and government securities. From 2001 
to 2007, the largest banks (those in Peer Group 1) make up ever higher of private-label securities 
within the study group, from 90.67% to 97.00%, making the holdings by smaller banks (those in 
Peer Groups 2, 3, and 4) less and less visible in Figure 4.
40 


















Note: Author’s tabulation using FR Y-9C data.    
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Besides the absolute measures of securitization illustrated above, I also examine the relative 
measures of securitization, which capture the position of securitization and the risk exposure 
related to securitization in a bank’s portfolio. Put differently, they measure the degree to which 
banks engage in securitization regardless of their sizes.  
Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9 demonstrate the relative size (as a percentage of total assets) 
of holdings of the private-label, GSE, and government securities, respectively, in the study group 
by peer group from 2001 to 2007. First, as illustrated in Figure 7, the largest banks (those in Peer 
Group 1) have the highest holdings of private-label securities at around 5 percent of their total 
assets. Moreover, percentagewise, holdings of private-label securities decrease as bank size 
decreases (i.e., to Peer Group 2, 3, and 4) with the smallest banks in the study group (those in 
Peer Group 4) having the lowest holdings of private-label securities at around 1 to 2 percent of 
their total assets. This suggests that larger banks are more likely to practice the new norm of risk-
taking by involving in the new business of investing in private-label securities. Second, the 
distribution of holdings of GSE securities across peer groups is less clear. According to Figure 8, 
it is the mid-size banks (those in Peer Group 2) that have the highest holdings of GSE securities 
percentagewise. Second, according to Figure 9, the largest banks (those in Peer Group 1) have 
the lowest holdings of government securities while smaller banks (those in Peer Groups 2, 3, and 
4) have much higher holdings. In contrast to private-label securities, government securities seem 
less attractive for the largest banks because they are less flexible and profitable.  
Taken together, the largest banks are more active in investing in private-label securities 
compared to government and GSE securities. In this way, private-label securities are more 
concentrated in the largest banks compared to government and GSE securities, in consistent with 
Acharya and Richardson’s (2009) findings. In addition, it is noteworthy to clarify that the smaller 
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size (both absolute and relative) of holdings of private-label securities compared to that of 
government and GSE securities combined should not be interpreted as insignificance of private-
label securities. Private-label securities, especially those with underlying asset of subprime 
mortgages, contain higher risk compared to government and GSE securities. Therefore, risk is 
concentrated in larger banks. Furthermore, as discussed above, private-label securities get 
favorably high ratings, therefore are assigned with low risk weight in the regulatory capital 
algorithm. To illustrate, a private-label MBS with high risk is assigned a 20% risk weight 
because of its favorably distorted high rating, then the bank holding it keeps a lower regulatory 
capital against this MBS, compared to the scenario if the MBS in question were assigned a 50% 
or 100% risk weight. However, when the mortgage market collapses with mortgagors starting to 
default, which is exactly what happened in 2007–2008, the asset value of MBS shrinks, but the 
bank holding it finds itself short of safety cushion because it does not have enough capital at 
hand. 
Securitization Activities 
This section reports the statistics of measures of securitization activities of bank holding 
companies, both in absolute and in relative terms.  
Figure 10 reports the longitudinal trend of securitization activities of the U.S. banking 
industry from 2001 to 2007. Total outstanding principal balance of securitization activities 
witnessed a decrease from $1,299.14 billion in 2001 to $786.42 billion in 2003. It bounced up 
and continued to grow since 2004, when subprime mortgage flooded into market, providing a 
larger pool of underlying asset for banks to engage in securitization activities. At the year end of 
2007, all bank holding companies reported $1,765.60 billion of outstanding principal balance of 
securitization activities. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Schedule HC-S of FR Y-9C reports 
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Note: Author’s tabulation using FR Y-9C data. 
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securitization activities by seven categories of underlying asset: (1) 1–4 family residential loans, 
(2) home equity lines, (3) credit card receivables, (4) auto loans, (5) other consumer loans, (6) 
commercial and industrial loans, and (7) all other loans, all other leases, and all other assets. 
Figure 10 also separates outstanding principal balance of securitization activities by these seven 
categories of underlying assets. Securitization activities with underlying asset of 1–4 family 
residential loans consistently made up the majority of securitization activities from 2001 to 2007, 
followed by those with underlying asset of credit card receivables. 
A considerably smaller number of banks engage in securitization activities. Out of 2,926 
bank-year observations, only 312 report non-zero outstanding principal balance of securitization 
activities. Figure 11 documents the percentage of bank holding companies engaging in 
securitization activities by peer group. Larger banks are more likely to engage in securitization 
activities. While more than half of the largest banks (those in Peer Group 1) engage in 
securitization activities, significantly fewer smaller banks report securitization activities from 
2001 to 2007. Figure 12 breaks up securitization activities by peer group. Securitization activities 
by bank holding companies in Peer Groups 2, 3, and 4 are barely noticeable in the figure, 
indicating that securitization activities by bank holding companies are highly concentrated in the 
largest banks (those in Peer Group 1). Figure 11 and Figure 12 demonstrate that, similar to 
holding private-label securities, engagement in securitization activities is an example of the new 
norm of risk-taking and the new business model of securitization. It is the larger banks who are 
more active in winning the access to and participate in this newly available business.  
Figure 13 reports the relative size of securitization activities (as a percentage of total assets) 
by peer group. Note that this figure only includes those banks with securitization activities. Since 
the vast majority of banks do not participate in securitization activities, the bars may be 
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Figure 13 Outstanding Principal Balance of Securitization Activities as a Percentage of Total Assets of Bank Holding Companies by 

















Note: Author’s tabulation using FR Y-9C data.
54 
influenced to some extreme cases out of 312 observations. For example, the bar for Peer Group 1 
in 2001 is high because of one bank that reported 2.07 times of outstanding principal balance of 
securities activities to its total assets. Figure 13 does not demonstrate a clear relationship 
between peer group (bank size) and securitization activities.  
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter reports the descriptive statistics for various forms of securitization banks engage 
in. First, holdings of private-label securities, which typically involve higher risk, witness a more 
notable increase compared to holdings of government and GSE securities. Note that banks are 
not allowed to invest in private-label securities under Glass–Steagall and actively mobilize to 
win the access to this market. By contrary, holding government and GSE securities have been 
common practice and conventional business for banks. Second, securitization activities also 
record an all-time high in 2007, topping at $1,765.60 billion of outstanding principal balance. 
Note that historically securitization activities, which means selling and securitizing assets, 
belong to investment, not commercial, banking. The deep involvement of banks in securitization 
activities is a result of the overturn of New Deal regulatory regime, which quarantines 
commercial banks from investment banking with higher risk. Third, while holdings of 
government and GSE securities are somewhat equally distributed across banks percentagewise, 
the new businesses of holding private-label securities and securitization activities are highly 
concentrated in larger banks, indicating that risk is concentrated in larger banks. 
Last but not least, Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 provide an alternative presentation of 
summary statistics to the figures above. It documents the summary statistics of measures of 
securitization of the study group (418 bank holding companies) used in the regression analysis in 
Chapter 5, both in 
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Table 3 Summary Statistics of Measures of Securitization of Bank Holding Companies, 2001 (N = 418) 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Holdings of private-label securities  
(in billions) 
0.00  64.49   0.55   4.26  
Holdings of private-label securities 
as a percentage of total assets 
0.00  34.64   2.30   3.92  
Holdings of government securities 
(in billions) 
0.00  47.41   0.63   3.15  
Holdings of government securities 
as a percentage of total assets 
0.00  49.78   10.85   8.35  
Holdings of GSE securities 
(in billions) 
0.00  58.26   0.99   5.07  
Holdings of GSE securities 
as a percentage of total assets 
0.00  65.03   9.42   8.78  
Outstanding principal of securitization 
activities (in billions) 
0.00 334.01 1.84 18.67 
Outstanding principal of securitization 
activities as a percentage of total assets 
0.00 207.22 1.79 12.21 
     
     




Table 4 Summary Statistics of Measures of Securitization of Bank Holding Companies, 2004 (N = 418) 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Holdings of private-label securities  
(in billions) 
0.00 98.73 0.83 6.34 
Holdings of private-label securities 
as a percentage of total assets 
0.00 33.03 1.89 3.57 
Holdings of government securities 
(in billions) 
0.00 77.53 0.92 5.01 
Holdings of government securities 
as a percentage of total assets 
0.00 50.60 11.32 8.43 
Holdings of GSE securities 
(in billions) 
0.00 184.30 1.59 10.50 
Holdings of GSE securities 
as a percentage of total assets 
0.00 55.61 9.86 9.33 
Outstanding principal of securitization 
activities (in billions) 
0.00 302.61 2.09 19.57 
Outstanding principal of securitization 
activities as a percentage of total assets 
0.00 50.70 0.87 4.79 
     
     




Table 5 Summary Statistics of Measures of Securitization of Bank Holding Companies, 2007 (N = 418) 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Holdings of private-label securities  
(in billions) 
0.00 174.25 1.39 10.77 
Holdings of private-label securities 
as a percentage of total assets 
0.00 38.20 1.87 3.69 
Holdings of government securities 
(in billions) 
0.00 64.83 1.04 5.60 
Holdings of government securities 
as a percentage of total assets 
0.00 40.53 8.99 6.88 
Holdings of GSE securities 
(in billions) 
0.00 168.78 1.81 11.23 
Holdings of GSE securities 
as a percentage of total assets 
0.00 41.56 7.87 6.81 
Outstanding principal of securitization 
activities (in billions) 
0.00 647.54 4.03 38.03 
Outstanding principal of securitization 
activities as a percentage of total assets 
0.00 69.26 1.20 6.95 
     
     
Note: Author’s tabulation using FR Y-9C data. 
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absolute term (in dollar amount) and in relative term (as a percentage of total assets), for three 
selected years: 2001, 2004, and 2007.  
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON SECURITIZATION 
 
In this chapter, I test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2 to investigate the effect of 
organizational causes on securitization. Specifically, I outline the findings on how capital 
dependence, organizational complexity, and political activity affect banks’ engagement in the 
two major types of securitization discussed in earlier chapters: (1) holdings of securities and (2) 
securitization activities.  
In the first section, I examine how organizational causes affect the extent to which banks 
invest in various categories of securities. Relative sizes of holdings of the three categories of 
securities (i.e., holdings of private-label, GSE, and government securities as a percentage of total 
assets) serve as dependent variables. Relative measures are used because they capture the extent 
to which banks are exposed to securitization and risk thereof.  
In the second section, I examine securitization activities. As significantly fewer banks engage 
in securitization activities, I test how capital dependence, organizational complexity, and 
political activity shape whether banks participate in securitization activities before testing how 
these factors affect the extent to which they engage in securitization activities.  
For each of the two sections, I detail the model specification before reporting and interpreting 
the results of regression analysis.  
Holdings of Securities 
In this section, I first demonstrate multiple model specifications using various estimation 
methods. I use holdings of private-label securities as a percentage of total assets as the dependent 
variable to demonstrate the process. I start with the simplest specification, modify it when 
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introducing possible concerns for the dataset and corresponding solutions, and end with the 
estimation of interest for interpretation. 
The basic model for panel regression is as follows: 
         
 
1 2 31 1
1, 2, ..., ,  1, 2, ...,  418,  7
i i i i iY t Y t X t K t u t
i N t T N T
       
   
                                        (1) 
In Equation (1) above,  iY t is the holdings of private-label securities as a percentage of 
banks’ total assets at time t and  1iY t   is its lagged value controlling the effect from last year 
(i.e., dynamic effect).  1iX t   is the matrix of explanatory variables. Note that I use lagged 
values of explanatory variables, since it takes time for these factors to influence the holdings of 
securities. In addition, the use of lagged explanatory variables might, although not always, 
alleviate endogeneity issue. (I will turn to dynamic panel data and endogeneity issues later.) 
 iK t  is the matrix of control variables.  iu t  is the total error term, which contains both 
unobserved time-invariant effects iv  and panel-specific errors  ie t : 
   i i iu t v e t                                                                  (2) 
Since the Equation (1) is highly likely to omit time-invariant factors that cannot be easily 
captured or readily measured and considering the dataset has a short time dimension (T = 7) and 
a large bank dimension (N = 418), I start with a fixed-effects model to estimate Equation (1). I 
also run a Hausman test to see whether random-effects or fixed-effects model provides efficient 
estimates. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is there is no correlation between right-hand 
side variables and unobserved effects iv . The results reject this null hypothesis (p = 0.0000) and 
therefore favor fixed-effects over random-effects model. By using least squares dummy variable 
(LSDV) estimator, fixed-effects model controls for the unobserved heterogeneity across banks. 
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Model 1 in Table 6 reports the results of this fixed-effects model. I also include time-fixed 
effects to capture the aggregate trends of change over time. Standard errors are clustered at the 
bank level to account for heteroskedasticity.  
Next, I test whether there is autocorrelation in this panel dataset. Autocorrelation means the 
correlation between values at different time points is a function of the time difference. It would 
bias the standard errors and make the estimation less efficient. A Woodridge test is employed to 
statistically test whether there is autocorrelation, the null hypothesis being there is no first order 
autocorrelation AR(1). The results reject this null hypothesis (p = 0.0000) in this dataset, 
suggesting one needs to take AR(1) into consideration. Model 2 in Table 6 reports the result of a 
fixed-effects model with AR(1) disturbance. The results of this model also report a Baltagi–Wu 
locally best invariant (LBI) test statistic, which is a modified version of Durbin–Watson statistic. 
While the Durbin–Watson statistic is widely used on time-series data as a measure of 
autocorrelation, Baltagi–Wu LBI statistic is designed for panel data. Baltagi–Wu LBI statistic for 
Model 2 is 2.05, suggesting that AR(1) is properly addressed. 
However, the fixed-effects model above does not fully address endogeneity. Specifically, 
there are three variables on the right-hand side of Equation (1) that might raise the endogeneity 
issue: the lagged dependent variable  1iY t   and two explanatory variables (profitability and 
risk-based capital ratio). Durbin–Wu–Hausman tests are employed to statistically ascertain if any 
right-hand side variable suffers from endogeneity. This test is used even if there is no external 
instrumental variable readily available. I use lagged variables as instruments, because they are 
less likely to be influenced by current shocks. Note that using lagged variable as instrument is 
also valid from a theoretical standpoint. I rewrite Equation (1) as follows: 
           1 2en en 2ex ex 31 1 1i i i i i iY t Y t X t X t K t u t                             (3)
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Table 6 Regression Analysis on Holdings of Private-Label Securities Using Various Estimation 
Methods, 2001–2007 
 
Models 1 2 3 4 
Holdings of securities 
(last year, log) 
0.4568*** 0.1491*** 0.1339* 0.8184*** 
(0.0306) (0.0228) (0.0658) (0.0638) 
Net interest margin 
(last year, log) 
–0.1597† –0.1785** –0.2991* –0.3624*** 
(0.0881) (0.0661) (0.1188) (0.1043) 
Risk-based capital ratio 
(last year, log) 
0.2452* 0.2805*** 0.7715** 0.7152* 
(0.0980) (0.0793) (0.2839) (0.3189) 
Number of layers 
(last year, log) 
0.0155 –0.0639 –0.0550 –0.0055 
(0.0339) (0.0816) (0.0756) (0.0505) 
Number of entities 
(last year, log) 
–0.0287 –0.0411 –0.0276 0.0245 
(0.0369) (0.0440) (0.0450) (0.0231) 
Lobbying expenditure 
(last year, log) 
0.0075 –0.0000 0.0007 0.0101* 
(0.0050) (0.0070) (0.0064) (0.0048) 
Peer group 2 dummy 
–0.1751 –0.2897*** –0.3244** –0.1089* 
(0.1097) (0.0825) (0.0545) (0.0546) 
Peer group 3 dummy 
–0.1484 –0.2113* –0.2780* –0.1272* 
(0.1234) (0.0981) (0.1319) (0.0579) 
Peer group 4 dummy 
–0.1642 –0.1997† –0.2787** –0.2107** 
(0.1293) (0.1061) (0.1412) (0.0728) 
Age (log) 
–0.0905 –0.2179 –0.2333† –0.0047 
(0.0746) (0.1398) (0.1202) (0.0239) 
District dummies (11) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (5) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,508 2,508 2,090 2,508 
Underidentification (p-value)   0.00  
Weak identification (C–D Wald F)   35.80  
Weak identification (K–P Wald F)   17.25  
Hansen J    0.46 0.51 
AR(2) (p-value)    0.28 
AR(3) (p-value)    0.24 
 
Note: † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Two-tailed tests.  
Model 1: Fixed-effects; Model 2: Fixed-effects with AR(1) disturbance;  
Model 3: 2SLS; Model 4: System GMM. 
C–D Wald F = Cragg-Donald Wald F; K–P Wald F = Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F. 
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In Equation (3), explanatory variables iX ’s are split into two groups: those which might be 
suspicious of endogeneity (with the subscript “en”) versus those which are more clearly 
exogenous (with the subscript “ex”). First,  1iY t   and  en 1iX t  ’s are regressed against their 
instruments (lagged values) and exogenous variables: 
       1 2 ex1 2 1i i i YY t Y t X t e                                                (4a) 
     en 1 en 2 ex (en)1 2 1i i i XX t X t X t e                                    (4b) 
 
Second, the residuals in Equations (4a) and (4b) is added onto Equation (3): 
           1 2en en 2ex ex 3 41 1 1i i i i i Y iY t Y t X t X t K t e u t                               (5a) 
           1 2en en 2ex ex 3 4 (en)1 1 1i i i i i X iY t Y t X t X t K t e u t                          (5b) 
 
If the coefficients for the residuals from Equations (4a) and (4b) yield significant results in 
Equations (5a) and (5b) (i.e., if 4 0  ), endogeneity is concluded to be problematic.  
Durbin–Wu–Hausman tests as illustrated above indicate that two variables on the right-hand 
side have endogeneity issue: the lagged dependent variable and risk-based capital ratio. 
Therefore, the estimations in Model 1 can be biased and inconsistent and therefore must be 
addressed by other techniques. 
The first technique I employ to deal with endogeneity is a conventional method: two stage 
least squares (2SLS) estimation. Starting with Equation (3), in the first stage, the endogenous 
variables are estimated with exogenous right-hand side variables and instrumental variables as 
follows: 
  1i iY YY t Z e                                                              (6a) 
 en (en) (en)1i i X XX t Z e                                                (6b) 
 
iZ ’s are the matrix of exogenous and instrumental variables. With this practice, the correlation 
between the endogenous variable and the error term in Equation (3) is removed. Again, as there 
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is no external instrumental variable readily available, one might use lagged endogenous variables 
as instruments, given the specification can pass the post-estimation diagnostic tests (see below). 
In other words, iZ ’s in Equations (6a) and (6b) include the lagged left-hand side variable and 
 en 2iX t  ’s (see Equations (3), (4a), and (4b)). In the second stage, the fitted values of the 
endogenous variables from the first stage, now exogenous, replace the original endogenous 
variables in the equation. 
A 2SLS estimation needs to pass a series of post-estimation diagnostic tests. The first is 
underidentification test, testing whether instruments are irrelevant. One would expect to reject 
this null hypothesis with a low p-value. The second is weak identification test, testing whether 
instruments are weak using Wald F statistic. One would expect a higher Wald F statistic than 
Stock–Yogo critical values. Last, post-estimation of 2SLS includes a Hansen J test to test if the 
instrument variables are exogeneous. One would expect a high p-value to show the exogeneity of 
instrument variables. 
Model 3 in Table 6 reports the results of 2SLS estimation. It also includes fixed-effects and 
provides robust standard error. Also note the number of observations drops from 2,508 (418 × 7) 
to 2,090 (418 × 5) due to the inclusion of second lag of variables. The results of all the post-
estimation diagnostic tests mentioned above are reported. As shown in Table 6, the p-value for 
underidentification test is 0.0000; Wald F statistic for weak instrument is 35.800 (Cragg–
Donald) and 17.249 (Kleibergen-Paap rk), both well above most Stock–Yogo critical values; the 
p-value for Hansen J test is 0.4632. Overall, these post-estimation diagnostic tests suggest that 
this 2SLS model is well specified.  
Yet another more recently developed technique is generalized method of moment (GMM). 
There are some particular features of this dataset that make GMM an ideal candidate to address 
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endogeneity. First, the dataset has a dynamic panel data structure and GMM is better suited with 
such a data structure. Second, there might be unobserved time-invariant bank-specific effect. 
Third, GMM uses lagged endogenous variables as instruments, which is particularly useful when 
there is no external instrumental variable readily available 
Specifically, GMM is based on the first differences of Equation (1). By first differencing, the 
time-invariant bank-specific effect is removed, similar to that in a fixed-effects model. Equation 
(7) below is the first differences of Equation (1): 
          1 2 31 1i i i i iY t Y t X t K t u t                                             (7) 
Equation (7) is estimated with lagged variables as instrumental variables to tackle endogeneity. 
Moreover, system GMM uses instruments for both the first-difference equation (Equation (7)) 
and the level equation (Equation (1)) to increase the efficiency of the estimates. 
Similar to those in 2SLS estimation, the post-estimation diagnostic tests of GMM estimation 
ask for a closer look when checking the validity of models. First, one needs to test whether all 
the instruments as a group are exogenous. Similar to 2SLS estimation, Hansen J statistic is used 
to test this null hypothesis. One would expect to have a high p-value to ensure the exogeneity of 
the instrumental variables. Second, one needs to make sure that there is no higher-order 
autocorrelation (e.g., AR(2) and AR(3)) and Arellano–Bond statistic is used to test this null 
hypothesis. One would also expect to have a high p-value to ensure there is no higher-order 
autocorrelation in the data.  
Model 4 in Table 6 reports the results of system GMM estimation. Specifically, it uses two-
step estimation, which is robust to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. For the 
GMM-style instrumental variables, I first try the second lag of endogenous variables and if this 
66 
specification does not pass diagnostic tests, I move to the third lag. I report the results of Hansen 
J test and Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) and AR(3) in Table 6.  
In particular, GMM-style instruments included in Model 3 are the third lag of the dependent 
variable and risk-based capital ratio that suffer endogeneity issue, with the p-values for Hansen J 
test at 0.49 and Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) and AR(3) at 0.28 and 0.23, well above any 
significance cut-off. Overall, these post-estimation diagnostic tests suggest that this GMM model 
is well specified.  
To summarize, I use holdings of private-label securities as a percentage of total assets as an 
example to illustrate the process of model specification. There are three steps: (1) perform 
conventional panel regression, including one with AR(1) disturbance; (2) identify possible 
endogenous right-hand side variables with the help of Durbin–Wu–Hausman tests; and (3) use 
2SLS and GMM estimations to address endogeneity issue, if any. 
Next, I use the results of system GMM models to make further interpretations, considering the 
advantages of GMM models discussed above. In Table 7, I report the results of GMM models on 
the other two categories of securities: securities issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (hereinafter “GSE securities”) and 
securities issued by government entities, including federal, state, and local governments 
(hereinafter “government securities”). I also include the GMM model on holdings of private-
label securities (i.e., Model 4 in Table 6) for comparison purposes. The dependent variable for 
Model 5 is holdings of GSE securities as a percentage of total assets; second lag of endogenous 
variables are used as instruments. The dependent variable for Model 6 is holdings of government 
securities as a percentage of total assets; third lag of endogenous variables are used as 
instruments (note that while the p-value for AR(2) test is smaller than 0.05, the p-value for 
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AR(3) test is above any significance cut-off). Recall from Chapter 3 that both dependent 
variables and explanatory variables are log-transformed, the coefficients represent the elasticities 
of the corresponding explanatory variables on dependent variables.   
Table 7 reports the results of three regressions, labeled as Models 4 through 6, on holdings of 
private-label, GSE, and government securities as a percentage of total assets, respectively. Model 
4 tests how capital constraint, organizational complexity, and political activity variables affect 
banks’ holdings of private-label securities. The results support the two capital dependence 
hypotheses (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). Profitability, measured by net interest margin, is negatively 
associated with holdings of private-label securities. When a bank experiences a lower 
profitability, it invests more in private-label securities. To illustrate, a 10% decrease in 
profitability from last year increases holdings of private-label securities by 3.40%. Risk-based 
capital ratio, a measure of constraint brought about by regulatory capital, is positively associated 
with holdings of private-label securities. A high risk-based capital ratio means that more capital 
is locked; securitization helps banks unlock capital and reduce capital dependence. A 10% 
increase in regulatory capital constraint from last year increases holdings of private-label 
securities by 7.05%. Together, the results offer strong support that holding private-label 
securities serves a tool for banks to reduce capital dependence. The results also support political 
activity hypothesis (Hypothesis 3), indicating that lobbying expenditure is positively associated 
with holdings of private-label securities. Banks more active in political activity also hold more 
private-label securities. A 10% increase in lobbying expenditure is associated with 0.09% 
increase in holdings of private-label securities. Two organizational complexity variables, number 
of layers and number of entities, do not yield statistically significant results. This might because 
holding securities on balance sheet does not ask for additional layers or entities such as 
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Table 7 Regression Analysis on Holdings of Securities by Category Using System GMM 
Estimation, 2001–2007 
Models 4 5 6 
Securities Category Private-Label GSE Government 
Holdings of securities 
(last year, log) 
0.8184*** 0.8210*** 0.8814*** 
(0.0638) (0.0651) (0.1049) 
Net interest margin 
(last year, log) 
–0.3624*** –0.0266 0.0785 
(0.1043) (0.0515) (0.1076) 
Risk-based capital ratio 
(last year, log) 
0.7152* 0.2864** –0.2528 
(0.3189) (0.0956) (0.2802) 
Number of layers 
(last year, log) 
–0.0055 0.2176** –0.0134 
(0.0505) (0.0788) (0.0396) 
Number of entities 
(last year, log) 
0.0245 0.0112 –0.0458† 
(0.0231) (0.0165) (0.0261) 
Lobbying expenditure 
(last year, log) 
0.0101* –0.0002 –0.0009 
(0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0042) 
Peer group 2 dummy 
–0.1089* 0.2211** –0.0254 
(0.0546) (0.0840) (0.0451) 
Peer group 3 dummy 
–0.1272* 0.2049** –0.0182 
(0.0579) (0.0775) (0.0410) 
Peer group 4 dummy 
–0.2107** 0.1797* –0.0276 
(0.0728) (0.0764) (0.0490) 
Age (log) 
–0.0047 0.0528* –0.0035 
(0.0239) (0.0238) (0.0219) 
District dummies (11) Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (5) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,508 2,508 2,508 
Hansen J  0.51 0.17 0.31 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.28 0.81 0.02 
AR(3) (p-value) 0.24 0.54 0.44 
 
Note: † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Two-tailed tests.  
C–D Wald F = Cragg-Donald Wald F; K–P Wald F = Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F. 
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off-balance-sheet SPVs.  
Model 5 tests how capital constraint, organizational complexity, and political activity 
variables affect banks’ holdings of GSE securities. The results lend support to one capital 
dependence hypothesis (Hypothesis 1b). A 10% increase in risk-based capital ratio results in a 
2.77% increase in holdings of GSE securities. The results suggest that in order to reduce capital 
constraint, banks also hold more GSE securities besides private-label securities. The results also 
lend support to one organizational complexity hypothesis (Hypothesis 2a). A 10% increase in 
number of layers is associated with a 2.10% increase in holdings of GSE securities. Model 4 
does not provide support for political activity hypothesis, which might be due to that investing in 
GSE securities has been a common practice historically. 
 Model 6 tests how capital constraint, organizational complexity, and political activity 
variables affect banks’ holdings of government securities. With regard to organizational 
complexity, it provides the opposite to Hypothesis 2b, in that banks with more entities hold less 
government securities. In fact, it echoes the findings in Figure 9 of Chapter 4, where the largest 
banks (those in Peer Group 1), who typically have more entities, hold the smallest amount of 
government securities percentagewise among all peer groups. One plausible explanation is that 
these large banks find government securities unattractive to hold, since they are the least flexible 
and profitable among all three categories of securities. In addition, Model 5 supports neither 
capital constraint nor political activity hypotheses, probably due to that holding government 
securities has always been legal even under Glass–Steagall that banks do not see government 
securities as a means to reduce capital constraint.  
It is worth comparing the results on holdings of three categories of securities. First, risk-based 
capital ratio, a measure of regulatory capital constraint, yields significant result on holdings of 
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two categories of securities: private-label and GSE securities. Recall that securities are assigned 
a lower risk weight than their underlying assets. Therefore, holding securities on balance sheet 
can reduce the amount of regulatory capital a bank has to hold under Basel I. Moreover, note that 
private-label securities and GSE securities consist of large amount of subprime MBS, which 
were rated favorably in a distorted way by rating agencies (Rona-Tas and Hiss 2010) and 
therefore asked for an even lower risk weight, offering more incentive for banks to invest in 
them. Second, profitability, measured by net interest margin, is negatively associated with 
holding of private-label securities, but not GSE or government securities. This suggests that 
banks see government and GSE securities differently from private-label securities. In contrast to 
private-label securities, which can be further packaged into more complicated financial products 
that are more lucrative and have higher liquidity, government and GSE securities are less flexible 
and less likely to boost profitability. Third, lobbying expenditure is positively associated with 
holdings of private-label securities but not with holdings of GSE or government securities. As 
discussed earlier, banks were not allowed to hold private-label securities under Glass–Steagall. 
Banks won the access to the market of private-label securities by actively engaging in political 
activity that redefined the political–legal and organizational arrangements related to 
securitization. In contrast, holding government and GSE securities has long been common 
practice. Fourth, peer group dummies yield significant results for holdings of private-label and 
GSE securities. Percentagewise, the largest banks (those in peer group 1) hold a higher amount 
of private-label securities, in line with the findings of descriptive analysis in Chapter 4 (see 
Figure 7). Since private-label securities involve higher risk, this finding suggests that larger 
banks are more prone to take higher risk and that risk is concentrated in larger banks. 
Meanwhile, smaller banks hold a higher amount of GSE securities.  
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Securitization Activities 
In addition to holding securities on their balance sheet, banks also participate in securitization 
activities, in which they sell and securitize assets such as mortgages, home equity lines, credit 
card receivables, and consumer loans. Historically, securitization activities belonged to 
investment banking and commercial banks were prohibited from this high-risk business under 
Glass–Steagall. However, banks gradually won the access to this new line of business and widely 
employ off-balance-sheet SPVs to engage in securitization activities. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, a much smaller portion of bank holding companies engaged in 
securitization activities from 2001 to 2007, compared to holding securities on balance sheet. Out 
of 2,916 bank-year observations, only 312 report non-zero outstanding principal balance of 
securitization activities. Therefore, I employ a two-step approach to analyze securitization 
activities, in which two regressions are performed.  
First, I examine whether a bank holding company engages in securitization activities in a 
particular year. Therefore, the dependent variable is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 
one if a bank participates in securitization activities (i.e., reports a non-zero outstanding principal 
balance of all assets securitized and sold) and the value of zero if not. Logistic model is 
employed to examine this dummy variable against explanatory variables. I take the dataset as a 
pooled cross-sectional dataset and apply logistic regression on it instead of using a fixed-effects 
model. This is because the dependent variable in question (whether a bank participates in 
securitization activities) varies greatly across banks but has little within-variation over time for 
each bank. To illustrate, in the dataset, 88.10% of the banks who report non-zero outstanding 
principal balance of securitization activities continue to engage in securitization activities in the 
next year, while 99.06% of the banks who do not engage in securitization activities keep 
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reporting no securitization activities in the next year. Under this circumstance, a fixed-effects 
estimate would have large standard errors and therefore is not feasible. Table 8 reports the results 
of this logistic regression. 
Second, I analyze the relative size of securitization activities (i.e., outstanding principal 
balance of all assets securitized and sold as a percentage of total assets) within the bank holding 
companies that report non-zero securitization activities. As this dependent variable is similar to 
those in the first section (i.e., holdings of securities as a percentage of total assets), I take similar 
steps to determine the model to report and interpret results. Fixed-effects model with an AR(1) 
disturbance is chosen and reported in Table 9 for the following reasons. First, fixed-effects 
model is favored over random-effects one with the help of a Hausman test (p = 0.0000). Second, 
for this specific dependent variable, there is no endogeneity issue found in Durbin–Wu–
Hausman tests. This may not be surprising considering the lack of similar pattern of outstanding 
principal balance of securitization activities over the seven years in my study group (see Figure 
13 in Chapter 4). In addition, statistically speaking, it would be infeasible to use GMM 
estimation because of the significantly smaller number of groups in this panel analysis, while the 
number of instruments would be almost the same size (note there are 35 or 38 instruments in 
Models 4, 5, and 6). Third, Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data suggests there is 
AR(1) in the dataset (p =0.0000). The Baltagi–Wu LBI test statistic of the model reported in 
Table 9 is 1.85, suggesting that AR(1) is properly addressed. 
Table 8 reports the results of logistic regression on whether a bank holding company engages 
in securitization activities. The results support organizational complexity hypotheses 
(Hypotheses 2a and 2b). A 10% increase in number of layers increases a bank’s odds of 
engaging in securitization activities by 9.90%. A 10% increase in number of entities increases a 
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Table 8 Regression Analysis on Engagement in Securitization Activities, 2001–2007 
Variables   
Net interest margin 
(last year, log) 
0.0900  
(0.3725)  
Risk-based capital ratio 
(last year, log) 
–1.4976**  
(0.5744)  
Number of layers 
(last year, log) 
0.9908*  
(0.4610)  
Number of entities 




(last year, log) 
0.0538*  
(0.0245)  
Peer group 2 dummy 
–1.0979***  
(0.2622)  
Peer group 3 dummy 
–2.0022***  
(0.3292)  









Observations 2,508  
 
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Two-tailed tests. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Logistic regression with maximum likelihood estimation. 
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Table 9 Regression Analysis on Outstanding Principal Balance of Securitization Activities, 
2001–2007 





Net interest margin 
(last year, log) 
0.0510  
(0.2489)  
Risk-based capital ratio 
(last year, log) 
0.2503  
(0.4018)  
Number of layers 
(last year, log) 
0.4262  
(0.3938)  
Number of entities 




(last year, log) 
0.0264†  
(0.0134)  






District dummies (11) Yes  
Year dummies (5) Yes  
Observations 194  
R-squared 0.7786  
 
Note: † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Two-tailed tests.  
Fixed-effects with AR(1) disturbance. 
  
75 
bank’s odds of engaging in securitization activities by 3.07%. These effects can be substantial 
considering the number of layers within a bank’s hierarchy in the study group varies from two to 
fifteen and the number of entities varies from two to more than one thousand (see Table 1 in 
Chapter 3). Recall that the organizational complexity measures collected from FR Y-10 include 
off-balance-sheet entities, the results lend strong support to the notion that banks set up off-
balance-sheet SPVs to engage in securitization activities. The results also indicate that political 
activity is positively associated with engagement in securitization, supporting Hypothesis 3. To 
illustrate, a 10% increase in lobbying expenditure increases a bank’s odds of engaging in 
securitization activities by 0.79%. This effect can also be substantial in that annual lobbying 
expenditure of banks ranges from zero to millions of dollars (see Table 1 in Chapter 3). In 
addition, peer group dummy variables provide significant result, implying that larger banks are 
more likely to engage in securitization activities. This is in line with descriptive analysis in 
Chapter 4 (see Figure 11). However, the analysis does not offer support to the two capital 
dependence hypotheses (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). Probability measured by net interest margin has 
no effect on whether a bank engages in securitization activities. One plausible explanation is that 
this measure is more influenced more by on-balance-sheet characteristics of a bank while 
securitization activities often take place off-balance-sheet via SPVs and therefore less influenced 
by on-balance-sheet measures. Moreover, the results suggest that risk-based capital ratio has a 
negative effect on securitization activities, opposite to Hypothesis 1b and the results on holdings 
of private-label and GSE securities. This might be due to the fact that regulatory capital 
algorithm in Basel I fails to squarely cover off-balance-sheet assets compared to on-balance-
sheet assets, since off-balance-sheet entities such as SPVs that banks use for securitization 
activities are subject to little oversight. Tarullo (2008:81) points out that Basel I addresses off-
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balance-sheet items incompletely, especially in the context of the United States, and is “quickly 
and repeatedly overtaken by innovative arbitraging measures” by banks. 
Table 9 reports the results of regression analysis testing how capital dependence, 
organizational complexity, and political activity variables affect the extent to which banks 
participate in securitization activities using a fixed-effects model with AR(1) disturbance. In this 
model, outstanding principal balance of securitization activities of last year does not yield 
significant result, which makes it the only model in which lagged dependent variable has no 
effect on the dependent variable.14 This indicates that securitization activities demonstrate a more 
fluctuated pattern, in line with Figure 13 in Chapter 4. The results support one organizational 
complexity hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b). A 10% increase in number of entities increases 
securitization activities by 4.31%, showing that banks use off-balance-sheet SPVs to increasingly 
engage in securitization activities. The results also support Hypothesis 3, in that banks more 
active in lobbying report a higher outstanding principal balance of securitization activities 
percentagewise. The coefficient is marginally significant at 0.05 level (p = 0.0515). A 10% 
increase in lobbying expenditure is associated with a 0.25% increase in outstanding principal 
balance of securitization activities. For peer group dummy variables, only one is left in the model 
while the other two are omitted because of multicollinearity resulted from small number of 
observations. The results imply that there is no relationship between bank size and the extent to 
which banks engage in securitization activities, echoing the findings in Chapter 4 (especially see 
Figure 13) that securitization activities in relative term do not have a clear distribution pattern 
                                                 
14 Note that in Model 2 in Table 6, which also uses fixed-effects estimation with AR(1) disturbance, the 
lagged dependent variable keeps having significantly positive coefficient, although smaller because of the 
inclusion of AR(1) disturbance.) 
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across peer groups. Nevertheless, in absolute term, the largest banks in Peer Group 1 consistently 
make up at least 98.7% of outstanding principal balance of securitization activities (see Figure 12 
in Chapter 4) and thereby keeping most of the risk related in them. The analysis nevertheless 
does not lend support to capital dependence hypotheses. The lack of support for capital 
dependence hypotheses may be because the on-balance-sheet nature of the two measures (net 
interest margin and risk-based capital ratio) in contrast to off-balance-sheet securitization 
activities, as argued above.  
Concluding Remarks 
The analysis demonstrated above investigates two forms of securitization of bank holding 
companies: holdings of securities and securitization activities. The former is further separated 
into three categories: private-label, GSE, and government securities. The latter is examined with 
the help of a two-step approach, in which whether a bank engages in securitization activities and 
the extent to which a bank engages in securitization activities are analyzed. 
The analysis above supports the organizational political economy framework and the notion 
that organizational causes—capital dependence, organizational complexity, and political 
activity—shape the extent to which banks engage in securitization. It also provides a more 
complicated and nuanced landscape of securitization in the U.S. banking industry by showing 
that the effect of capital dependence, organizational complexity, and political activity vary across 
different forms of securitization. Table 10 summarizes the findings of the analysis in the two 
sections above. 
Capital dependence affects holdings of securities, suggesting that holding securities serves a 
leeway for banks to unlock more capital and reduce capital constraint. Net interest margin has a 
negative effect on holdings of private-label securities. Risk-based capital ratio has a positive 
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Net interest margin (–)     
Risk-based capital ratio (+) (+)  (–)  
Organizational Complexity 
Number of layers  (+)  (+)  
Number of entities   (–) (+) (+) 
Political Activity 
Lobbying expenditure (+)   (+) (+) 
Peer Group (+) (–)  (+)  
      
Note: (+/–) means the variable in the left-most column (except for “peer group”) has a positive/negative and significant effect on the variable in 




effect on holdings of both private-label and GSE securities, two categories with securities of 
higher risk. By holding private-label and GSE securities, banks can reduce regulatory capital 
they have to hold under Basel I. Capital dependence does not seem to affect securitization 
activities as hypothesized, probably because the measures used do not capture the off-balance-
sheet nature of securitization activities and Basel I fails to fully address off-balance-sheet assets. 
Organizational complexity influences securitization activities and less so holdings of 
securities. Securitization activities, such as selling and securitizing 1–4 family residential loans 
and credit card receivables, typically asks for new entities (often off-balance-sheet SPVs) added 
into the hierarchy of a bank holding company. Holding securities on balance sheet, on the 
contrary, does not always involve additional entities or layers. 
Political activity is positively related to banks’ engagement in newly available business 
including holdings of private-label securities and securitization activities but not holdings of 
government and GSE securities. Banks were forbidden to invest in private-label securities and 
participate in securitization activities under Glass–Steagall and won the access through a series 
of lobbying effort, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
With regard to bank size captured by peer group dummies, larger banks are more active in 
newly available business they staunchly lobby for. They hold a higher amount of private-label 
securities not only in absolute value but also percentagewise. They are also more likely to 




CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
Unregulated securitization is a major contributor to the financial crisis of 2007–08; banks are 
major participants in securitization before the financial crisis of 2007–08. This study examines 
securitization in the U.S. banking industry before the crisis by employing the organizational 
political economy framework, which calls for a closer investigation on the corporate–state 
relations and the changes in political–legal and organizational arrangements. In the historical 
contextualization in Chapter 2, I identify and elaborate three specific political–legal and 
organizational arrangements that make securitization legal, viable, and favorable for banks to 
engage in: (1) the attack on Glass–Steagall, (2) the use of special purpose vehicles (SPVs), and 
(3) regulatory capital requirements. With the conceptual framework and historical 
contextualization, I further argue that there are three organizational causes of banks’ increasing 
engagement in securitization: (1) capital dependence, (2) organizational complexity, and (3) 
political activity.  
The quantitative analysis that follows first provides a detailed look at the degree to which 
banks engage in various forms of securitization across bank sizes. Chapter 4 demonstrates that 
compared to their smaller counterparts, larger banks are more likely to participate in certain 
forms of securitization such as holding private-label securities and securitization activities 
(selling and securitizing assets), which typically involve higher risk. In this way, risk is highly 
concentrated in large banks. Then, I present a regression analysis in Chapter 5 on how the three 
organizational causes noted above affect various forms of securitization of banks. The findings 
lend general support to the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2, but in a more nuanced way. 
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Roughly speaking, banks with higher capital dependence hold more securities on balance sheet 
but not necessarily engage in securitization activities; banks with higher organizational 
complexity are more active in securitization activities but not necessarily in holding securities on 
their balance sheet; banks that are more active in political mobilization hold more private-label 
securities, are more likely to engage in securitization activities, and report higher amount of 
outstanding principal balance of securitization activities. The detailed findings speak to the 
specifics of different forms of securitization, echoing the historical contextualization. 
Implications on Securitization Studies 
It is not surprising that securitization has received attention in the literature of finance and 
economics. This body of literature focuses mainly on how securitization helps improve various 
performance indicators and alleviate risk portfolio of banks (e.g., Uzun and Webb 2007; Laeven 
and Levine 2009; Casu et al 2011). Securitization is therefore an explanatory variable in the 
formula. The sociological study presented here, however, conceptualizes securitization as the 
dependent variable and focuses on how it is shaped by economic, political, legal, and 
organizational factors. For example, instead of showing that securitization improves performance 
and mitigates risk, I highlight that banks engage more in securitization when their performance 
deteriorates, and their regulatory capital burden elevates. The difference between these two types 
of arguments cannot be overstated. While the former speaks to the corporate strategy within 
organization, the latter is a critical assessment of the political embeddedness of banks and how it 
affects organizational behavior and strategy of banks. In this way, this study attempts to live up 
to the tradition of sociology in examining how political and economic phenomena are 
intertwined with other dimensions of society. 
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One of the primary contributions of this study is that it collects a wide range of data, develops 
measures for various forms of securitization, and offers an organizational-level analysis on 
securitization across banks sizes and over the seven years before the financial crisis. This is an 
improvement to earlier sociological (and political economic) research on securitization, which 
usually takes securitization as a single industry-wide variable without looking into different 
forms of securitization or across bank sizes (e.g., Campbell 2010; Fligstein and Goldstein 2010; 
Johnson and Kwak 2010; Krippner 2012). It is worth noting that this more fine-grained analysis 
is contextualized in political–legal and organizational arrangements associated with 
securitization, which are shaped by various groups of social actors over time, as elaborated in the 
first two chapters. The historical contextualization in Chapter 2 illustrates that securitization 
takes various forms; while some have long been common practice and allowed under Glass–
Steagall (e.g., holding securities issued by government agencies), some are newly legal and 
viable and quickly become favorable for banks after a series of reconfiguration of political–legal 
and organizational arrangements promoted by their political mobilization in the last quarter of 
the 20th century. Furthermore, the setting of this study, as detailed in Chapter 3, allows a closer 
assessment of securitization of the U.S. banking industry by introducing multiple measures of 
securitization and categorization of banks by their size (peer groups) in the later chapters. With 
regard to data, the FR Y-9C form (Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding 
Companies) asks banks to report various forms of securities they hold on balance sheet and their 
securitization activities, allowing me to develop measures capturing various forms of 
securitization. 
Overview of securitization. — Securitization takes various forms in the banking industry. 
Historically, banks are allowed to hold securities issued by government agencies on their balance 
83 
sheet. By contrary, holding private-label securities and selling and securitizing assets 
(securitization activities) are forbidden under Glass–Steagall. However, the reconfiguration of 
political–legal and organizational arrangements in the last quarter of the 20th century presents 
the opportunities and incentive for banks to enter the newly available and expanding securities 
market.  
Chapter 4 illustrates how the new opportunities of holding private-label securities experiences 
a far more remarkable increase compared to conventional business of holding government and 
GSE securities. In 2007, the U.S. banking industry held $676.49 billion of private-label 
securities, making up more than one-third (33.43%) of $2,023.59 billion of all categories of 
securities. Both the size ($676.49 billion) and share (33.43%) of private-label securities are all-
time highs during the time period of this study. In addition, the U.S. banking industry records 
$1,765.60 billion of outstanding principal balance of securitization activities in 2007, also the 
highest during the time period of this study. The sheer size of thousands of billions suggests how 
deeply banks are involved in securitization and how much risk is accumulated in the banking 
industry. 
Chapter 4 also demonstrates the distribution of various forms of securitization across banks 
with different sizes. Compared to government and GSE securities, private-label securities and 
outstanding principal balance of securitization activities are more concentrated in larger banks. 
With tangible profitability pressure, complex organizational structure, and deep pocket for 
political mobilization, larger banks find it attractive to enter the newly available and lucrative 
securities market. This finding is reconfirmed by the regression analysis in Chapter 5. 
Considering the higher risk involved in private-label securities and securitization activities, risk 
is also highly concentrated in larger banks. 
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Capital dependence. — This study argues that securitization is a means for banks to reduce 
their capital dependence and gain more autonomy by unlocking more capital. The finding in 
Chapter 5 shows that when banks experience lower profitability, they invest more in private-
label securities; when banks have a higher risk-based capital ratio, which means higher 
regulatory capital burden, they invest more in private-label and GSE securities. Put it differently, 
holding securities, at least certain categories thereof, is a way for banks to boost profitability and 
mitigate regulatory capital burden. 
Risk-based capital ratio deserves more discussion since it is significantly and positively 
related to holdings of two of the three categories of securities yet receives little attention in 
sociological research on securitization. This finding suggests that holding private-label and GSE 
securities on balance sheet is perceived by banks as a way to help reduce burden brought about 
by regulatory capital, the capital banks are mandated to hold that acts as a safety cushion. This is 
rooted in the design of algorithm of regulatory capital requirement, in which securities are 
assigned with a lower risk weight compared to their underlying assets, and therefore ask for a 
lower amount of regulatory capital to be held against. In this way, banks find it more attractive to 
hold securities instead of loans and mortgages on their asset side. It is noteworthy to point out 
that the algorithm of regulatory capital requirement in practice is anything but objective in that it 
does not truly reflect the risk profile of different categories of assets. For instance, as rating 
agencies tend to favorably lift the ratings of securities (Rona-Tas and Hiss 2010), certain 
securities are given distorted high rating and thus assigned even lower risk weight even if they 
carry high risk. This is especially true for private-label and GSE securities, both including large 
chunks of subprime MBS. The lower regulatory capital needed to be held against off-balance-
sheet assets is also questionable. In principle, the move of assets from balance sheet to off-
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balance-sheet must be a “true sale”—the assets and the risk related must be removed from the 
balance sheet to a legally remote third party (a SPV). This is also the underlying rationale for the 
smaller-than-one credit conversion factor and the lower regulatory capital needed for off-
balance-sheet assets. In practice, however, banks widely use implicit recourse15 in securitization 
of credit card receivables (Calomiris and Mason 2004) and asset-backed commercial papers 
(Acharya et al 2013). This is labeled as “regulatory arbitrage” in that it reduces risk-based 
regulatory capital while keeping risks on balance sheet by moving assets to off-balance-sheet 
entities. Regulatory arbitrage is shown to help banks reduce their capital requirement (Acharya et 
al 2013) and boost their stock returns (Higgins and Mason 2004). While this study does not 
provide direct support to the regulatory arbitrage argument considering the insignificant or 
negative effect of risk-based capital ratio on securitization activities (see Chapter 5, especially 
Table 8 and Table 9), it does indicate that banks are able to reduce regulatory capital and keep 
risks on their balance sheet at the same time by holding securitized assets. Note that most banks 
have a risk-based capital ratio well above the minimum of 8% (see Table 1 in Chapter 3, the 
mean of risk-based capital ratio is 13.46%), a higher risk-based capital ratio leaves banks more 
room to invest more in securities on balance sheet, which is more flexible and profitable, yet 
involves higher risk not reflected by the regulatory capital requirement. 
Organizational complexity. — This study contends that securitization of banks is also driven 
by higher organizational complexity. Banks have become more concentrated, integrated, and 
                                                 
15 For example, a bank (a sponsor of SPV) steps in an ABS deal which is approaching early amortization 
to avoid potential loss to ABS investors (Calomiris and Mason 2004:6, fn. 1). In this scenario, the bank in 
question is providing a de facto recourse, therefore keeping the risk on balance sheet. This is a violation 
of FAS 125 and FAS 140. 
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complex since the late 1970s. The newly defined organizational arrangements allow banks to 
enter virtually any line of business they would like to have access to. Conglomerates that 
umbrella thousands of entities and provide one-stop financial services from loan issuance, 
securities underwriting, insurance, to merger and acquisition advising become more and more 
common in the landscape of the U.S. banking industry. In my study group consisting of 418 bank 
holding companies, the median number of entities within the bank hierarchy rises from 7 to 9 
(average number from 28.57 to 37.06), with the largest number grows from 1,574 (Citigroup) to 
a whopping 2,894 (JPMorgan Chase), between 2001 and 2007. 
To engage in securitization, banks set up new entities, including off-balance-sheet SPVs, and 
add more layers into their hierarchy. This is especially true if banks want to engage in 
securitization activities (selling and securitizing assets) that are formerly prohibited under Glass–
Steagall. The regression analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates that organizational complexity is 
positively associated with securitization activities (see Table 8 and Table 9), which are far from 
traditional business of banks but warmly welcomed by banks as the boundary between 
commercial and investment banking blurs. 
Political activity. — The last quarter of the 20th century witnessed a series of deregulation in 
the financial sector. The reconfiguration of political–legal and organizational arrangements that 
make securitization legal, viable, and favorable for banks are prompted largely by banks through 
their political mobilization. Since the late 1970s, banks have been constantly and fervently 
attacking the New Deal regulatory regime, featured by Glass–Steagall, which separated 
commercial from investment banking, and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which 
prohibited mergers between banks and nonbanks. They triumphed with the Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act of 1999 and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which granted banks 
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access to multiple lines of business including securities market and leave them an environment of 
loose regulation (Prechel and Morris 2010; Prechel and Hou 2016). 
The analysis uses lobbying expenditure as the measure of political activity and demonstrates 
that banks with higher lobbying expenditure invest more in private-label securities, are more 
likely to engage in securitization activities, and have a higher amount of outstanding principal 
balance of securitization activities. Note these two forms of securitization—holding private-label 
securities and securitization activities—were both prohibited under Glass–Steagall because of the 
higher risk involved. This finding suggests that banks more active in political mobilization are 
those who are more active in newly available business, which typically involves higher risk.  
Theoretical Implications  
This study demonstrates the importance of guidance of theory. To illustrate, the hypotheses 
raised in Chapter 2 are derived from a well-defined conceptual framework and historical 
contextualization. The research design in Chapter 3, including the multiple measures of 
securitization and categorization of banks by bank size, are developed from the conceptual 
framework and historical contextualization.  
This study follows organizational political economy framework by examining the interplay 
between dimensions of the social structure: organizations, politics, law, and the economy. The 
historical contextualization that follows is an analysis of the corporate–state dynamics in a 
sufficiently long period of history. In this way, this study speaks to theoretical traditions in 
multiple areas in sociology, especially economic sociology, sociology of organizations, and 
political sociology.  
Embeddedness. — As preluded in the last section, mainstream (neo-)classical economics has 
a tendency of taking social context as an exogenous factor in examining economic phenomena. 
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In contrast, sociologists contend that economy cannot be separated from society. In his historical 
account, Polanyi ([1944] 2001) criticizes that classical economic theory is ahistorical and claims 
that any attempt to disembed the economy from the society is doomed to fail. One of the greatest 
tenets of Polanyi is the notion that the economy and markets are always embedded in a large 
social, cultural, and political framework. 
The concept of “embeddedness” takes root in the areas of economic sociology and sociology 
of organizations alike. It should be noted that embeddedness should not be reduced to social 
network analysis, whose micro interpretation of embeddedness departs from Polanyi’s tenets. 
Instead, organizational political economy framework draws from Polanyi and others to posit that 
organizations are politically embedded, and that political embeddedness affects organizational 
behavior (Prechel 2000). In its application, this macro emphasis propels an examination of 
historical changes in the political–legal and organizational arrangements in which organizations 
in question are embedded (Prechel and Morris 2010; Prechel and Hou 2016).  
To illustrate, organizational political economy framework agrees with resource dependence 
theory (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) that business organizations are not 
self-contained. Instead, business organizations are dependent on pivotal resources, especially 
capital and access to markets, which are not fully controlled by themselves but are largely 
determined by the environment they are embedded in. However, organizational political 
economy framework highlights the political embeddedness in the interdependency of corporate–
state relations that resource dependence theory lightly touches. To overcome capital constraint, 
business organizations actively participate in political mobilization such as lobbying to reshape 
the political–legal and organizational arrangements. The consequence of this reconfiguration, as 
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this study shows, is that it offers business organizations (banks) more leeway (participation in 
newly available securities market) to reduce capital dependence.  
Corporate–state relations. — The power relations between the state and society is one of the 
central issues in political sociology. Theoretical discussions on society–state relations can be 
roughly grouped into society-centered and state-centered perspectives. On one hand, society-
centered perspective takes the state either as a neutral device of conflict-resolving as in pluralism 
(Dahl 1958; Polsby 1960; Lindblom 1982; Manley 1983) or as a reflection of elite interests 
(Mills 1956; Useem 1982; Domhoff 2006; Mizruchi 2013). It implicitly rules out the possibility 
that the state is able to generate and implement its own agenda. On the contrary, state-centered 
perspective suggests that societal groups are subject to the influence of the state as an 
institutional structure (Block 1977; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Skocpol 1985; Weir, Orloff, and 
Skocpol 1988). In other words, interests and collective actions of societal groups are constrained 
by the structure of the state and thus shaped by the state. It explicitly argues that the state has the 
capability to develop its autonomous agenda independent of societal groups. 
As Chapters 1 and 2 show, the two major lines in sociological examination of securitization 
both suffer a one-sided focus either on the financial sector or on the state. While the first line of 
literature that sees securitization as a new business model and new norm assumes the financial 
sector drives the creation and expansion of the securities market on its own (e.g., Davis 2009; 
Guillen and Suarez 2010; Palmer and Maher 2010; Fligstein and Goldstein 2012, 2014), the 
second line that focuses on regulatory records implies that the state independently grants 
property rights to and implement regulatory policies on market participants (e.g., Campbell 
2010; Krippner 2012). However, deregulation in the financial sector since the late 1970s is 
largely the result of political mobilization led by the corporate sector (Prechel and Morris 2010; 
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Prechel and Hou 2016; Prechel and Zheng 2016). Organizational political economy framework 
calls attention to both sides and highlights the dynamics of the society–state relations. 
In particular, organizational political economy contends that organizations are major actors in 
corporate–state relations and that the state as a complex organization and business organizations 
are interdependent with each other. While the U.S. state has no independent source of revenues 
and is dependent largely on tax it collects from business organizations, business organizations 
are dependent on pivotal resources such as capital and market access that are controlled and 
regulated by the state. Furthermore, organizational political economy framework maintains that 
the interdependency of corporate–state relations should be analyzed in a historical setting. In 
other words, one needs to identify historical conditions that shape the dynamics between the state 
and business organizations, which further contribute to the changes in the political–legal and 
organizational arrangements. The historical contextualization detailed in Chapter 2 is an exercise 
following this call. 
Directions on Future Research  
There are several ways to extend this study. First, the setting of this study is pre-crisis years. I 
investigate how securitization got popular in the banking industry before the financial crisis. 
However, one would find it natural to extend the examination of securitization after 2007–08. 
How did measures of various forms of securitization change during and after the crisis? How did 
the corporate–state relations between the banking industry and the state shape the regulatory 
reform, notably the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, during and after the crisis? Are the organizational 
causes that predict securitization before the crisis, as shown in this study, still work after the 
crisis? This last question would be particularly interesting to see if the regulatory reform changes 
the political–legal and organizational arrangements in which banks are embedded and alters the 
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opportunities and incentives of banks to engage in organizational strategy and behavior involving 
high risk. 
Second, this study takes securitization as an organizational-level behavior of banks. It would 
also be interesting to see the decision-making process of this organizational strategy and 
behavior inside the complex organizations of banks. Literature has demonstrated how historical 
conditions affect the change in CEO’s background (Prechel 2000) and how internal power 
dynamics of organizations result in change in CEO’s background, which further shape 
organizational strategy and behavior (e.g., Fligstein 1985; Mizruchi and Stearns 1994; Zorn 
2004). An analysis of C-level bank executives, as well as banks’ appetite for recruiting finance 
students, through archival research, surveys, and field research can be a helpful micro-level 
complement to this study. It would complete our understanding of securitization and, more 
broadly, organizational behavior and strategy of banks.  
Third, while I detail the corporate–state dynamics in the policy formation process, the 
question of how to make effective policy and regulation is beyond the scope of this study. This 
normative question becomes more urgent than ever in this era of rapid change. In retrospect, 
securitization was an innovation for the financial sector. However, it is far from the last 
innovation embraced by the financial sector that regulators fail to handle accordingly. Rather, it 
foreshadows a whole range of innovations while the financial sector becomes a seemingly 
ubiquitous power bloc. In recent years, trending buzzwords such as retail investment apps, 
financial technology (FinTech), and initial coin offering (ICO), just to name a few, are giving 
regulators a hard time to catch up and understand, let alone to react properly and promptly. More 
broadly, financial innovations impose challenges for a variety of social groups, from consumers 
of financial products, retirees who rely on pension funds, small business owners who finance 
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their business in the financial market, to homeowners holding mortgages. People from all walks 
of life find themselves impossible to stay away from finance yet know little about it. We need a 
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF 418 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS16 
 
RSSD ID Name 
1951350 CITIGROUP INC. 
1073757 BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION 
1039502 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 
1073551 WACHOVIA CORPORATION 
2816906 TAUNUS CORPORATION 
1120754 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 
1119794 U.S. BANCORP 
1131787 SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. 
1132449 CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 
1069125 NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION 
1111435 STATE STREET CORPORATION 
1074156 BB&T CORPORATION 
1070345 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 
1068025 KEYCORP 
1025608 BANCWEST CORPORATION 
1199611 NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION 
1245415 HARRIS FINANCIAL CORP. 
1037003 M&T BANK CORPORATION 
1199844 COMERICA INCORPORATED 
1249196 TD BANKNORTH INC. 
1078529 BBVA USA BANCSHARES, INC. 
1378434 UNIONBANCAL CORPORATION 
1068191 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED 
1027004 ZIONS BANCORPORATION 
1117679 COMMERCE BANCORP, INC. 
                                                 
16 The list is sorted in descending order of total assets in 2007. Bank names in 2007 might be different 
from names in other years; however, RSSD ID (Replication Server System Database ID), assigned by the 
Federal Reserve to financial institutions, does not change. 
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RSSD ID Name 
1129382 POPULAR, INC. 
1094640 FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORPORATION 
1078846 SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP. 
2132932 NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANCORP, INC. 
1080465 COLONIAL BANCGROUP, INC., THE 
1826056 RBC CENTURA BANKS, INC. 
1199563 ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 
1883693 BOK FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
2801546 W HOLDING COMPANY, INC. 
2744894 FIRST BANCORP 
1075612 FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES, INC. 
1049341 COMMERCE BANCSHARES, INC. 
2389941 TCF FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1020902 FIRST NATIONAL OF NEBRASKA, INC. 
1117129 FULTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1027518 CITY NATIONAL CORPORATION 
1130780 FBOP CORPORATION 
1141599 SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., THE 
1102367 CULLEN/FROST BANKERS, INC. 
1205688 CITIZENS REPUBLIC BANCORP, INC. 
1097614 BANCORPSOUTH, INC. 
1117156 SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES, INC. 
1048773 VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP 
2734233 EAST WEST BANCORP, INC. 
2694814 UCBH HOLDINGS, INC. 
1888193 WILMINGTON TRUST CORPORATION 
1104231 INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES CORPORATION 
1079740 WHITNEY HOLDING CORPORATION 
1118797 FIRST BANKS, INC. 
1025309 BANK OF HAWAII CORPORATION 
1070804 FIRSTMERIT CORPORATION 
1843080 CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP 
1095674 ARVEST BANK GROUP, INC. 
2260406 WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
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RSSD ID Name 
1049828 UMB FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
2847115 SANTANDER BANCORP 
2894230 DISCOUNT BANCORP, INC. 
1079562 TRUSTMARK CORPORATION 
1200393 CORUS BANKSHARES, INC. 
1060627 FIRSTBANK HOLDING COMPANY 
1094314 CENTRAL BANCOMPANY 
2747644 UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORPORATION 
1249347 UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS, INC. 
1208184 FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP, INC. 
1141786 ALABAMA NATIONAL BANCORPORATION 
1076217 UNITED BANKSHARES, INC. 
1098303 OLD NATIONAL BANCORP 
1090987 MB FINANCIAL, INC 
1114605 CHITTENDEN CORPORATION 
1029884 PACIFIC CAPITAL BANCORP 
1020180 BREMER FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1427239 EASTERN BANK CORPORATION 
2947435 BBVAPR HOLDING CORPORATION 
1142336 PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION 
1247633 PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORPORATION 
1031449 SVB FINANCIAL GROUP 
1109599 PROSPERITY BANCSHARES, INC. 
1029222 CVB FINANCIAL CORP. 
1199732 IRWIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1086533 HANCOCK HOLDING COMPANY 
3005332 F.N.B. CORPORATION 
1075911 FIRST CITIZENS BANCORPORATION, INC. 
2490575 ORIENTAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC. 
1071306 FIRST COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
2477754 INVESTORS BANCORP, MHC 
1245620 BANK LEUMI LE-ISRAEL CORPORATION 
1117026 NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARES, INC. 
1022764 CENTRAL PACIFIC FINANCIAL CORP. 
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RSSD ID Name 
1136661 OCEAN BANKSHARES, INC. 
2107707 DICKINSON FINANCIAL CORPORATION II 
1135972 MERCANTIL COMMERCEBANK HOLDING CORPORATION 
1070448 WESBANCO, INC. 
1123670 FIRST INTERSTATE BANCSYSTEM, INC. 
1139279 NBT BANCORP INC. 
1208661 AMCORE FINANCIAL, INC. 
2875332 FIRST COMMUNITY BANCORP 
2349815 WESTERN ALLIANCE BANCORPORATION 
1839319 PRIVATEBANCORP, INC. 
1490701 JOHNSON FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 
2291914 IBERIABANK CORPORATION 
1247334 CAPITOL BANCORP LTD. 
1076132 FIRST CHARTER CORPORATION 
2003975 GLACIER BANCORP, INC. 
1136670 RIVERSIDE BANKING COMPANY 
1048867 COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM, INC. 
1053272 PINNACLE BANCORP, INC. 
1025541 WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION 
1105425 STERLING BANCSHARES, INC. 
2126977 BANNER CORPORATION 
1199602 1ST SOURCE CORPORATION 
1106516 FIRST NATIONAL BANK GROUP, INC. 
2706735 TEXAS CAPITAL BANCSHARES, INC. 
1203602 FIRST BUSEY CORPORATION 
2641201 FIRST NATIONAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY 
2368106 SNBNY HOLDINGS LIMITED 
1031346 FRONTIER FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
2900261 HANMI FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1117192 HARLEYSVILLE NATIONAL CORPORATION 
1208559 FIRST MERCHANTS CORPORATION 
1201934 CHEMICAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1133286 BANCFIRST CORPORATION 
1029464 W.T.B. FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
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RSSD ID Name 
1209828 MIDWEST BANC HOLDINGS, INC. 
1098844 RENASANT CORPORATION 
2495039 TAYLOR CAPITAL GROUP, INC. 
1201233 GREAT WESTERN BANCORPORATION, INC. 
1064278 INTRUST FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1364071 FIRST STATE BANCORPORATION 
1071397 S & T BANCORP, INC. 
1071276 FIRST FINANCIAL BANCORP 
1132654 INTEGRA BANK CORPORATION 
1139242 SUN BANCORP, INC 
1143829 STERLING FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1201925 INDEPENDENT BANK CORPORATION 
1206546 HEARTLAND FINANCIAL USA, INC. 
1247893 PLAINS CAPITAL CORPORATION 
2078816 COLUMBIA BANKING SYSTEM, INC. 
1097025 REPUBLIC BANCORP, INC. 
1102312 FIRST FINANCIAL BANKSHARES, INC. 
1204627 METROPOLITAN BANK GROUP, INC. 
1248304 SANDY SPRING BANCORP, INC. 
1133277 GREEN BANKSHARES, INC. 
1070644 COMMUNITY TRUST BANCORP, INC. 
1048652 U.S.B. HOLDING CO., INC. 
2244358 SECURITY BANK CORPORATION 
1050712 VALLEY VIEW BANCSHARES, INC. 
1136803 INDEPENDENT BANK CORP. 
1142448 CITY NATIONAL BANCSHARES, INC. 
1097089 BANK OF THE OZARKS INC 
1401109 AMERICAN CHARTERED BANCORP, INC. 
1094828 SIMMONS FIRST NATIONAL CORPORATION 
2611718 AMBOY BANCORPORATION 
1206911 OLD SECOND BANCORP, INC. 
1249598 ORION BANCORP, INC. 
1029893 WEST COAST BANCORP 
1107205 AMARILLO NATIONAL BANCORP, INC. 
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RSSD ID Name 
1085509 CAPITAL CITY BANK GROUP, INC. 
1199974 FIRST AMERICAN BANK CORPORATION 
1133437 SCBT FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1062621 SOUTHWEST BANCORP, INC. 
1486517 CHINATRUST CAPITAL CORPORATION 
1115349 WASHINGTON TRUST BANCORP, INC. 
1209109 MAINSOURCE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 
1137770 WOODFOREST FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 
1404799 LAKELAND BANCORP, INC. 
1076262 CITY HOLDING COMPANY 
2339133 GREAT SOUTHERN BANCORP, INC. 
2961879 NARA BANCORP, INC. 
1085013 SEACOAST BANKING CORPORATION OF FLORIDA 
1061679 ALPINE BANKS OF COLORADO 
1060328 COBIZ FINANCIAL, INC. 
1199992 SHOREBANK CORPORATION, THE 
2367921 TOMPKINS FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1096505 FIRST SECURITY BANCORP 
1048803 HUDSON VALLEY HOLDING CORP. 
1076431 FIRST BANCORP 
1971693 UNION BANKSHARES CORPORATION 
1138012 BANCTRUST FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 
1208595 FIRST FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1245068 SOUTHSIDE BANCSHARES, INCORPORATED 
2942702 STURM FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 
1245590 STANDARD BANCSHARES, INC. 
1478017 FIRST COMMUNITY BANCSHARES, INC. 
2634696 MACATAWA BANK CORPORATION 
1080595 COMMUNITY BANCSHARES OF MISSISSIPPI, INC. 
1026801 FREMONT BANCORPORATION 
2608763 MERCANTILE BANK CORPORATION 
1031627 AMERICANWEST BANCORPORATION 
1082067 AMERIS BANCORP 
2332750 CAPITAL CORP OF THE WEST 
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RSSD ID Name 
1103177 AMERICAN STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
2687795 CAMBRIDGE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 
1098732 FARMERS CAPITAL BANK CORPORATION 
1076002 NEWBRIDGE BANCORP 
2532402 SINOPAC BANCORP 
1200692 PARKWAY BANCORP, INC. 
1097306 BANCPLUS CORPORATION 
2049302 INTERVEST BANCSHARES CORPORATION 
1039454 STERLING BANCORP 
2303910 ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL SERVICES CORP 
1208906 LAKELAND FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1100037 CADENCE FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1030170 TRICO BANCSHARES 
2807614 PENNSYLVANIA COMMERCE BANCORP, INC. 
1116609 UNIVEST CORPORATION OF PENNSYLVANIA 
2670573 GB&T BANCSHARES, INC. 
1132104 FIRST SOUTH BANCORP, INC. 
1133473 FNB UNITED CORP. 
1070578 PEOPLES BANCORP INC. 
1427501 COMMUNITY BANKSHARES, INC. 
1399765 1867 WESTERN FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
2066886 ROGERS BANCSHARES, INC. 
1032464 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, INC. 
2158156 CENTRAL BANCSHARES, INC. 
1245705 WEST SUBURBAN BANCORP, INC. 
1058398 DURANT BANCORP, INC. 
1417333 STATE BANKSHARES, INC. 
1106879 BROADWAY BANCSHARES, INC. 
1117259 OMEGA FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1067804 HILLCREST BANCSHARES, INC. 
2326629 ANB CORPORATION, THE 
1204560 FIRST BANCSHARES, INC. 
1130249 CAMDEN NATIONAL CORPORATION 
1207431 STARK BANK GROUP, LTD. 
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RSSD ID Name 
1062649 UNITED BANCORPORATION OF WYOMING, INC. 
1109991 NORTH AMERICAN BANCSHARES, INC. 
1081118 FIDELITY SOUTHERN CORPORATION 
1966671 WHITAKER BANK CORPORATION OF KENTUCKY 
1111088 CENTURY BANCORP, INC. 
1245291 HILLS BANCORPORATION 
1095982 FIRST M & F CORPORATION 
1207486 MARQUETTE NATIONAL CORPORATION 
1099328 MERCANTILE BANCORP, INC. 
1059715 AMERICAN NATIONAL CORPORATION 
1138861 STATE BANCORP, INC. 
1141647 STAR FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 
2502049 VIRGINIA FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 
1048812 ARROW FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1066713 SUNFLOWER BANKS, INC. 
2907822 MBT FINANCIAL CORP. 
2781910 FARMERS & MERCHANTS BANCORP 
2592714 HOMETOWN COMMUNITY BANCORP, INC. 
2432614 FNB CORPORATION 
1126046 STOCKMAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1208120 HEARTLAND BANCORP, INC. 
1249730 S. Y. BANCORP, INC. 
1132672 FIRST UNITED CORPORATION 
2896458 BANCORP RHODE ISLAND, INC. 
2345068 LEGACYTEXAS GROUP, INC. 
1130865 SUFFOLK BANCORP 
1249002 FIDELITY BANCSHARES (N.C.), INC. 
1141348 MINNWEST CORPORATION 
2344799 METROCORP BANCSHARES, INC. 
1249712 PORTER BANCORP, INC. 
2704562 DANVERS BANCORP, INC. 
1247679 SUMMIT FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 
1123072 FISHBACK FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
2568362 CASCADE FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
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RSSD ID Name 
1209145 BRIDGEVIEW BANCORP, INC. 
1427275 STEARNS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. 
1121229 DACOTAH BANKS, INC. 
2343662 HORIZON FINANCIAL CORP. 
1208308 MERCHANTS & MANUFACTURERS BANCORPORATION, INC. 
1491360 FIRST BANK CORP 
1056161 TRINITY CAPITAL CORPORATION 
1123915 KLEIN FINANCIAL, INC. 
1134322 FIRSTBANK CORPORATION 
1134498 INWOOD BANCSHARES, INC. 
1206591 CENTRUE FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
2634874 HERITAGE COMMERCE CORP 
2651590 PEAPACK-GLADSTONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1210066 WEST BANCORPORATION, INC. 
2004141 WILSON BANK HOLDING COMPANY 
2509413 ROCKVILLE FINANCIAL MHC, INC. 
2697347 FVNB CORP. 
1081873 COMMUNITY BANKSHARES, INC. 
1066209 LAURITZEN CORPORATION 
1140510 ALLIANCE FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
2560263 FIRST NATIONAL COMMUNITY BANCORP INC 
1202052 NEB CORPORATION 
1143623 CITIZENS AND NORTHERN CORPORATION 
1054514 LANDRUM COMPANY 
2324429 ROYAL BANCSHARES OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC. 
1209136 HORIZON BANCORP 
1133503 CANANDAIGUA NATIONAL CORPORATION 
1055315 F & M BANCORPORATION INC. 
1075984 PALMETTO BANCSHARES, INC. 
2322304 FIRST MARINER BANCORP 
1075694 SOUTHERN BANCSHARES (N.C.), INC. 
2976396 SIERRA BANCORP 
2291624 BANK OF KENTUCKY FINANCIAL CORPORATION, THE 
1057588 COMMERCE BANK AND TRUST HOLDING COMPANY 
111 
RSSD ID Name 
1085170 COLONY BANKCORP, INC. 
1143762 FOUNDERS GROUP, INC. 
1083934 PAB BANKSHARES, INC. 
2038409 HAWTHORN BANCSHARES, INC 
2835514 BOILING SPRINGS, MHC 
1023239 MERCHANTS BANCSHARES, INC. 
1135824 EMPRISE FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1126475 ANCHOR BANCORP, INC. 
1128358 FRANDSEN FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
2149622 NATIONAL BANK OF INDIANAPOLIS CORPORATION, THE 
1130584 RCB HOLDING COMPANY, INC. 
2066868 BANC ED CORP., THE 
1126354 MINNEHAHA BANSHARES, INC. 
1205398 BANK OF HIGHLAND PARK FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
2388878 BEACON BANCORP 
1098620 GERMAN AMERICAN BANCORP, INC. 
1136139 LEESPORT FINANCIAL CORP. 
1140659 COMMUNITY FIRST BANCSHARES, INC. 
2728157 BERKSHIRE BANCORP INC. 
1202708 BAYLAKE CORP. 
1207600 PRINCETON NATIONAL BANCORP, INC. 
1048894 FIRST OF LONG ISLAND CORPORATION, THE 
2461016 ENTERPRISE BANCORP, INC. 
1071669 LNB BANCORP INC. 
1064728 FIRST FIDELITY BANCORP, INC. 
1050909 CITIZENS BANCSHARES CO. 
2833604 FIRST MUTUAL BANCSHARES, INC. 
1398807 REPUBLIC FIRST BANCORP, INC. 
1048764 CENTER BANCORP, INC. 
1203509 FIRST CITIZENS FINANCIAL CORP. 
1206760 FIRST MID-ILLINOIS BANCSHARES, INC. 
1104923 EXTRACO CORPORATION 
1139532 CIB MARINE BANCSHARES, INC. 
1902651 MERIDIAN FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC 
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RSSD ID Name 
2803719 MIDWEST BANKCENTRE, INC. 
2467689 COMMERCE BANCSHARES CORP. 
1058594 COPPERMARK BANCSHARES, INC. 
1103766 LONGVIEW FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1134023 GREATER COMMUNITY BANCORP 
1250473 FIRST CO BANCORP, INC. 
1119495 MONTGOMERY BANCORPORATION, INC. 
1134078 FIRST INDEPENDENT INVESTMENT GROUP, INC. 
1401118 IBT BANCORP, INC. 
2429838 SHORE BANCSHARES, INC. 
1029334 NORTH VALLEY BANCORP 
1134694 ATBANCORP 
1204814 SBC, INCORPORATED 
2757531 ALIANT FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1133174 PEOPLES FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1122123 FIRST WESTERN BANCORP, INC. 
1117464 ACNB CORPORATION 
1128769 MERCHANTS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 
1200348 SECURITY NATIONAL CORPORATION 
2624398 FIRST MUTUAL OF RICHMOND, INC. 
2521509 FIRST SOUTH BANCORP, INC. 
1118425 FIRST CHESTER COUNTY CORPORATION 
1205026 VAN DIEST INVESTMENT COMPANY 
3059504 HOME FEDERAL BANCORP 
2818245 PEOPLES BANCORP OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC. 
1117316 AMERISERV FINANCIAL, INC 
1139925 NATIONAL BANKSHARES, INC. 
2166124 HERITAGE FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1064429 CENTRAL OF KANSAS, INC. 
1098796 FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES, INC. 
1137958 INTERNATIONAL BANCORP OF MIAMI, INC. 
2835475 NORWAY BANCORP, MHC 
1134108 CNB CORPORATION 
2127657 FIRST TRUST CORPORATION 
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RSSD ID Name 
1202258 AMES NATIONAL CORPORATION 
1094613 DELTA BANCSHARES COMPANY 
1118340 CNB FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1130098 ALPINE BANCORPORATION, INC. 
1115013 CAMBRIDGE BANCORP 
2545831 LSB FINANCIAL 
2810285 SOUTH CENTRAL BANCSHARES OF KENTUCKY, INC. 
1139466 SALIN BANCSHARES, INC. 
1201363 BANKMANAGERS CORP. 
1138795 TEAM FINANCIAL, INC. 
1083783 FIRST FARMERS AND MERCHANTS CORPORATION 
1076673 OLD POINT FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1052378 HNB CORPORATION 
1029482 RCB CORPORATION 
1108350 AUSTIN BANCORP, INC. 
1134630 FARMERS & MERCHANTS BANCORP, INC. 
1966783 MASSBANK CORP. 
1071191 FARMERS NATIONAL BANC CORP. 
1135516 UNITED BANCORP, INC. 
1048670 WILBER CORPORATION, THE 
2861492 HARLEYSVILLE SAVINGS FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1203974 TRI CITY BANKSHARES CORPORATION 
1133594 CHEMUNG FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1020676 AMALGAMATED INVESTMENTS COMPANY 
1141674 IBT BANCORP, INC. 
1205053 MIDWESTONE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC 
2012436 OHIO VALLEY BANC CORP. 
1100813 FIRST TEXAS BANCORP, INC. 
1141487 CHAMBERS BANCSHARES, INC. 
1076691 AMERICAN NATIONAL BANKSHARES INC. 
1472220 HIGH POINT BANK CORPORATION 
1204177 FIRST STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1406999 O.A.K. FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
2121552 FIDELITY BANCORP, INC. 
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RSSD ID Name 
1208009 FIRST MANITOWOC BANCORP, INC. 
1118948 COMMONWEALTH BANCSHARES, INC. 
1206733 GREAT LAKES FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. 
1917600 HENDERSON CITIZENS BANCSHARES, INC. 
1245228 ISB FINANCIAL CORP. 
1248162 BNCCORP, INC. 
2582827 NORTHWAY FINANCIAL, INC. 
2497462 DCB FINANCIAL CORP 
1086168 UNITED SECURITY BANCSHARES, INC. 
2465519 UFS BANCORP 
1210589 NORTHERN STATES FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
1823608 MARINE BANCORP, INC. 
2244545 CITCO COMMUNITY BANCSHARES, INC. 
1117491 FNB BANCORP, INC. 
1104660 DIBOLL STATE BANCSHARES, INC. 
2858773 FIDELITY D&D BANCORP, INC. 
2007647 PREMIER FINANCIAL BANCORP, INC. 
2460569 NVE BANCORP, MHC 




MEASURES OF SECURITIZATION OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 
 
Measure Operationalization 
Holdings of private-label securities 
BHCK1709 + BHCK1713 + BHCK1733 + BHCK1736 + BHCKB838 + BHCKB840  
+ BHCKB842 + BHCKB844 + BHCKB846 + BHCKB848 + BHCKB850 + BHCKB852  
+ BHCKB854 + BHCKB856 + BHCKB858+ BHCKB860 + BHCK3536 
Holdings of GSE securities  
BHCK1698 + BHCK1702 + BHCK1703 + BHCK1707 + BHCK1714 + BHCK1717  
+ BHCK1718 + BHCK1732 + BHCK3534 + BHCK3535 
Holdings of government securities 
BHCK0211 + BHCK1287 + BHCK1289 + BHCK1293 + BHCK1294 + BHCK1298  
+ BHCK8496 + BHCK8499 + BHCK3531 + BHCK3532 + BHCK3533 
Securitization activities 
BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710  
+ BHCKB711 
  









2001: ((BHCK4074 + BHCK4301) / (BHCK0395+ BHCK0397 + BHCK1350 + BHCK2122 + 
BHCK3545 + BHCK1754 + BHCK1772)) × 100  
2002 to 2007: ((BHCK4074 + BHCK4301) / (BHCK0395+ BHCK0397 + BHDMB987 + 
BHCKB989 + BHCK2122 + BHCK3545 + BHCK1754 + BHCK1772)) × 100 
Risk-based capital ratio BHCK7205  
Number of entities Calculated from FR Y-10 
Layer of entities Calculated from FR Y-10 
Lobbying expenditure Retrieved from OpenSecrets.org by Center for Responsive Politics 
Age Calculated from RSSD9950 
Year (dummies) 2001 to 2007 
District (dummies) Generated from RSSD9170 
  
Note: Items starting with BHCK, BHDM, and RSSD refer to the data mnemonics in FR Y-9C. 
 
                                                 
17 The calculation of interest-earning asset (denominator of net interest margin) is slightly different in 2001 from 2002 to 2007. “Federal funds sold 
and securities purchased under agreements to resell” reported as BHCK1350 is split into two items, BHDMB987 and BHCKB989, since 2002.  
